It’s time to sober up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of creativity and innovation by Khessina, O et al.
Research in Organizational Behavior xxx (2018) xxx–xxx
G Model
RIOB 115 No. of Pages 29It’s time to sober up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term
consequences of creativity and innovation
Olga M. Khessinaa, Jack A. Goncaloa,*, Verena Krauseb
aUniversity of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, United States
bUniversity College London, United Kingdom
A R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Available online xxx
Keywords:
Creativity, innovation
Creativity costs
Innovation costs
Creativity consequences
Innovation consequences
Disinhibition
Invention
A B S T R A C T
The literatures on creativity and innovation are each premised on the same important assumption that
has gone largely unquestioned: Creativity and innovation are outcomes that are almost inherently
positive. Decades of research on creativity in organizations have been motivated by the assumption that
creative ideas can be implemented to realize innovations that will inevitably increase proﬁt, strengthen
competitive advantage and ensure ﬁrm survival. The assumption that creativity and innovation have
positive downstream consequences has constrained existing research by forcing a myopic focus on
creativity and innovation as dependent variables. Thus, in a signiﬁcant departure from the existing
literature, we turn the tables to conceptualize creativity and innovation as independent variables that can
have a sweeping and frequently negative impact on a wide range of other important outcomes. We
conclude by calling for a new stream of research to more soberly evaluate the direct costs, side effects and
long-term consequences of creativity and innovation.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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The large and vibrant literatures on creativity and innovation are each premised
on the same important assumption that has gone largely unquestioned: Creativity
and innovation are outcomes that are almost inherently positive. A recent
inﬂuential review of these literatures probably states this assumption most clearly:
“Creativity and innovation can occur at the level of the individual, work team,
organization, or at more than one of these levels combined but will invariably result
in identiﬁable beneﬁts at one or more of these levels of analysis.” (Anderson,
Poto9cnik, & Zhou, 2014: 1298; italic is added for emphasis). In other words,
creativity and innovation are widely assumed to be positive by deﬁnition (Gilson,
2008; Gong, Zhou & Chang, 2013).
Creativity is a fruitful change in perspective that results in insights, inventions
and enlightenments (Cronin & Loewenstein, 2018). Creativity has been heralded
as the engine of scientiﬁc discovery and the fundamental driving force of positive
change (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010); an ability that has been associated with
intelligence, wisdom, and moral goodness (Niu & Sternberg, 2006; Sternberg,
1985). Decades of research on creativity in organizations have been motivated by
the assumption that creative ideas can be implemented to increase proﬁt,
strengthen competitive advantage and ensure ﬁrm survival (Amabile, 1988;
Amabile & Pratt, 2016; George, 2007; Gilson, 2008; Woodman, Sawyer, & Grifﬁn,
1993).
In a similar vein, most research on innovation has taken for granted that
innovation, deﬁned as an invention that has been successfully implemented and
brought to market (Edwards & Gordon, 1984; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986), is largely
beneﬁcial for ﬁrm performance and survival (for review see Ahuja, Lampert &
Tandon, 2008). Since the seminal works of Schumpeter (1934, 1942) on the central
role of innovation in the evolution of industries and markets, a long stream of
research has investigated how innovation affects the development of ﬁrms and
industries (for reviews see Ahuja et al., 2008; Freeman & Soete,1999). The dominant
view in this literature is that in dynamic industries, innovation can directly beneﬁt
ﬁrms. Firms that successfully innovate experience positive consequences for their
performance, while ﬁrms that fail to innovate are likely to lose in competition, exit
the industry and thereby reduce the competitive pressure on surviving ﬁrms (e.g.,Please cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
creativity and innovation, Research in Organizational Behavior (2018), hAbernathy & Clark, 1985; Eggers, 2012; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Klepper & Simons,
2000a; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Tripsas, 1997).
Because winning the innovation battle is allegedly so critical to ﬁrm
performance and survival, scholars in management and related disciplines have
fully investigated the antecedents of innovation. Scholars have traced this process
from the beginning by thoroughly unearthing the numerous cognitive (Nijstad, De
Dreu, Rietzschel, & Baas, 2010), affective (Amabile, Mueller, Barsade, & Staw, 2005)
and social (Amabile & Pratt, 2016; Sutton & Hargadon, 1996) antecedents of
creativity. A similar effort has been undertaken at the macro level where there has
been a broad focus on all of the intervening processes that lead up to an invention
commercialized into an innovation (Dougherty & Hardy, 1996; Garud, Tuertscher, &
Van de Ven, 2013; Henderson, 1993; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; Katila & Shane,
2005;). This herculean effort has revolved around the questionable assumption that
creativity and innovation have positive downstream consequences. This assump-
tion has constrained existing research by forcing a myopic focus on creativity and
innovation as exclusively dependent variables. Thus, in a signiﬁcant departure from
the existing literature, we turn the tables to conceptualize creativity and innovation
as independent variables and in doing so, we discover that both creativity and
innovation can have sweeping and frequently negative effects.
We begin by investigating the psychological, interpersonal and behavioral
consequences of creativity in organizations. An important theme that emerges from
our review is that, though most organizations desire creativity, there are important
negative repercussions that might result from being creative at work. We develop a
theoretical perspective in which engaging in the creative process can cause
disinhibition – a psychological state that we link to a range of important
consequences such as rule breaking, workaholism, over-indulgence, risk taking and
aggression.
The potentially negative outcomes of creativity might be justiﬁable if the end
result – a commercially viable innovation – would ensure ﬁrm survival. Yet, we also
undertake a comprehensive review of existing work on innovation to question this
deeply rooted assumption on two fronts. First, the empirical studies that
purportedly demonstrate the positive consequences of innovation share important
ﬂaws that cast doubt on this conclusion. Second, the beneﬁts of innovation might
occur only under very speciﬁc circumstances that existing research has not yet fullyer up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.riob.2018.11.003
O.M. Khessina et al. / Research in Organizational Behavior xxx (2018) xxx–xxx 3
G Model
RIOB 115 No. of Pages 29identiﬁed. Indeed, our review of the costs of innovation suggests that even a
commercially successfully innovation, one that is proﬁtable on the market, can still
threaten the long-term survival of a ﬁrm. We conclude by calling for a new stream of
research evaluating the psychological and organizational consequences of
creativity and innovation.
From creativity to innovation: how the process unfolds
In the literature, the boundaries between creativity and innovation are not
always clear (see also Anderson et al., 2014). In this chapter, we suggest that
creativity and innovation are the beginning and ending points of an innovation
process in organizations – a process that unfolds in a series of steps (see Fig. 1). The
process starts with creativity, deﬁned as the generation of an idea that is novel and
useful (Amabile, 1996; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988). A creative idea can be
produced in a focal organization or borrowed from the outside (Zhou & Shalley,
2011). If relevant organizational decision makers ﬁnd the creative idea appealing,
they will support the development of this creative idea into a full-ﬂedged invention
or prototype (Mueller, Melwani, Loewenstein, & Deal, 2018). The last step of the
innovation process requires commercializing an invention into an innovation that
necessarily involves the successful implementation of a prototype into production
and bringing it to market (Edwards & Gordon, 1984). In other words, the transition
from a creative idea to invention involves idea implementation, and the transition
from invention to innovation involves invention implementation. Though these
transitions are distinct, they are often treated as interchangeable (Garud et al.,
2013).
Clarifying the distinctions between creativity, invention and innovation reveals
that disproportionate attention is paid to the consequences of invention, but the
literature has yet to fully consider and account for the consequences of creativity
and innovation (see Fig. 1). Most agree that invention is risky and can generate
signiﬁcant costs, but it is widely assumed that creativity and innovation are
inherently good, and the more the better (Anderson et al., 2014). The logical basis
for this assertion has been questioned, but research on the consequences of
creativity and innovation remains at a nascent stage of development. Moreover, the
range of negative consequences considered in existing research is exceedingly
narrow. Thus, we offer a systematic and comprehensive review that not only waves
caution ﬂags about the possibility of negative consequences, but also identiﬁes the
underlying mechanisms that might explain why these costs accrue.
We suggest that when evaluating the consequences of either creativity or
innovation, we need to look at their net beneﬁts. To do so, it is important to take into
account the entire equation – not just the total beneﬁts, but also the total costs of
creativity and innovation:
Net benefits of ðcreativity=innovationÞ ¼ Total benefits of ðcreativity=innovationÞ
 Total costs of ðcreativity=innovationÞ
Chapter overview
Our coverage of the literatures on creativity and innovation is wide-ranging. In
the chapter that follows, we review many different literatures, spanning multiple
levels of analysis and crossing several related ﬁelds. The processes leading from a
creative idea to an invention and ﬁnally to innovation are complex and diverse in
their mechanisms and consequences. Yet, there are a few general parallels in effects
of creativity and innovation on organizations. Both creativity and innovation may
bring not only beneﬁts, but also signiﬁcant costs to companies and their employees.Fig. 1. Steps in the pro
Please cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
creativity and innovation, Research in Organizational Behavior (2018), hAlthough the variety of these possible consequences is large, they can be
analytically grouped into three major themes: (1) inherent costs of action, (2)
side effects, and (3) long-term consequences. We use these common themes to
organize our review and analysis of creativity and innovation as independent
variables. We cover both positive and negative consequences of creativity and
innovation for organizations, with a main emphasis on the negative effects that
have been largely ignored. Table 1 provides a road map for our review and analysis.
EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF CREATIVITY
Creativity is a crucial driving force behind most, if not all, new
endeavors. In ﬁelds as disparate as art, science, and technology,
creative ingenuity is a highly desirable skill (Alperson, 2003; Kern,
2010; Simonton, 2004). Any occupation that demands the
generation of new ideas, new technology, or creative content
actively seeks to attract individuals with creative talent (Florida,
2014). Nevertheless, many disparate streams of research converge
on the possibility of negative consequences related to creativity at
work.
Inherent costs of creativity
In this section, we review the inherent costs involved in being
creative. Creative ideas, employees and leaders are likely to
encounter immediate resistance. We focus on four key sources of
resistance: (a) explicit resistance to creative ideas, (b) implicit
resistance to creative ideas, (c) resistance from creative employees,
and (d) resistance to creative leadership. Countering these
oppositional forces in the pursuit of creativity is likely to generate
signiﬁcant direct costs.
Explicit resistance to creative ideas
Creative ideas can potentially solve problems, lead to more
efﬁcient work processes and even boost well-being (Cronin &
Loewenstein, 2018; Feist, 1994), but there are many reasons for
employees to explicitly reject them. First, given that creative ideas
can upset the status quo (Nemeth,1986; Nemeth & Staw, 1989) and
call into question long held assumptions about the way work is
done, one employee’s creative idea could undermine other
employees’ prior work, expertise and contributions. For example,
in the 1990s, Kodak employees with experience and expertise in
ﬁlm photography were not welcoming of creative advances of co-
workers in digital photography and even sometimes sabotaged
them (Gavetti, Henderson, & Giorgi, 2005). Second, endorsing
another employees’ creative idea could make that person seemcess of innovation.
er up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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Table 1
Map of creativity and innovation consequences.
I. Creativityconsequences II. Innovation consequences
(1) Inherent costs of action a) Explicit resistance to creative ideas
b) Implicit resistance to creative ideas
c) Resistance from creative employees
d) Resistance to creative leadership
 Innovation outcomes:
a) Costs of incorrect forecast of market demand
b) Costs of unsuccessful appropriability
c) Beneﬁts and costs of complicated relationships with audiences
 Innovation development:
a) Costs of frequent product innovations
b) Costs of simultaneous development of multiple innovations
c) Costs of innovation in structurally complex organizations
(2) Sideeffects a) Beneﬁts and costs of creative disinhibition
b) Stereotype reduction
c) Social connection
d) Creative inﬂation
a) Risk of cannibalization
b) Intensiﬁed competition
c) Harm to audiences and society
(3) Long-termconsequences a) Formation of creative identity
b) Traps of past creative success
c) Erosion of standards used to evaluate new ideas
a) Costs of organizational identity violation
b) Traps of past innovation success
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possible replacement. In other words, politically motivated
evaluators might reject creative ideas to avoid a competitive
threat (Menon, Thompson, & Choi, 2006). Third, it is not enough to
have a creative idea—ideas must move to the invention stage in
which they are prototyped, tested, reﬁned and tested again until
the initial idea reaches fruition (West, 2002). The impending stage
of innovation can involve a great deal of time, effort and
investment so evaluators might reject a creative idea simply to
avoid the work involved in making the idea become reality. In
short, if I endorse your creative idea, I might have to help you
implement it and that might generate extra work for me. Though
the idea might generate value for the organization in the long-run,
evaluators might be more motivated by narrow self-interest.
Finally, creative ideas, if implemented, could disrupt longstanding
norms and routines, thus forcing people to adjust (Gilbert & Bower,
2002). As cognitive misers, it might be more tempting to rely on
habit than relearn how to do things in a new way, even if new
approaches have the potential to boost efﬁciency in the long run
(Ford & Ford, 1995; Reger, Gustafson, Demarie, & Mullane, 1994;
Robertson, Roberts, & Porras, 1993). Though it is tempting to
subscribe to the rosy view of creative evaluation—a view in which
people value progress, are open to new and better ways of
approaching their work and are willing to take on additional work
to improve the organization—self-interest might come into play
(Bruhn, Zajac, & Al-Kazemi, 2001). Evaluators might happily
endorse creative ideas so long as those ideas are not threatening,
risky or likely to require additional work or cognitive adjustment
on their part.
Implicit resistance to creativity
Despite the litany of reasons for explicitly rejecting creative
ideas, the bias against creativity may not be conscious or
deliberate. Explicit judgments of creative ideas are judgments
that are intentionally and deliberately generated (Ferguson, Hassin
& Bargh, 2008). Most research has focused on explicit judgments of
creativity (Mann, Katz, Ferguson & Goncalo, 2018). For example, in
past research evaluators have generated explicit judgments about
the creativity of new products like towel carriers (Berg, 2016), new
ideas like how to improve the student experience at a university
(Mueller, Wakslak & Krishnan, 2014) or new entrepreneurial
pitches (Brooks, Huang, Kearney, & Murray, 2014). Explicit
judgments about creativity tend to be positive—few decision
makers would admit to rejecting a creative idea simply because it
is creative (Staw, 1995; Mueller et al., 2012). Yet, using a modiﬁedPlease cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
creativity and innovation, Research in Organizational Behavior (2018), hImplicit Association Test, Mueller et al. (2012) uncovered an
implicit bias against creativity that caused evaluators to reject
creative ideas in favor of purely practical solutions. Although
gatekeepers may explicitly claim to desire creativity, the risks
involved in actually endorsing a creative idea inﬂuence their
judgments. Ideas that diverge from the status quo may not only
turn out to be wrong (March, 1991), but may also encounter
resistance because they are initially perceived as deviant, risky or
unproven (Mueller et al., 2012). The bias against creative ideas
might not be explicit or overt but it can cause evaluators to subtly
reject creative ideas in favor of ideas that are more practical or
easily implemented (Mueller et al., 2012).
The bias against creativity is also strongly in force among
individuals with the power to make decisions and allocate
resources (Mueller et al., 2018). Being in the role of a decision
maker prompts an economic mindset that causes evaluators to
downgrade creative ideas with cues of low social approval (Mueller
et al., 2018). Though we would hope that gatekeepers have the
courage, given their decision making power, to endorse ideas that
are risky and controversial, the very decision making role they
embody works against their willingness to do so. In sum, creative
ideas may be valued in theory, but in practice they are often
regarded as too risky to actually pursue (Mueller et al., 2012).
Resistance from creative employees
Given that creativity is viewed as an engine of economic growth
and prosperity, there is a widespread interest in understanding
who creative people are and how ﬁrms, cities and regions can cater
to their preferences and thereby attract more creatives (Florida,
2014). In seeking to attract creative people, some research has
highlighted their quirky but loveable idiosyncrasies – they would
rather wear a hoodie and jeans than a three-piece suit, pay for
experiences over possessions and seek learning opportunities
rather than advancement up a traditional hierarchy (Florida, 2014).
Yet, as Staw (1995) noted, if organizations really understood the
dark side of creative personalities, many organizations would
probably avoid them. Creative people can be highly reactive –
defying authority simply to demonstrate their independence
(Brehm, 1966; Gough, 1979). Rather than being the cooperative
team players that are prized in many organizations, creative people
can be arrogant, self-interested and self-absorbed (Gough, 1979;
McMullan, 1976).
Creative people can also be highly unpredictable – working
when they are inspired rather than adhering to deadlines
(Mackinnon, 1962; Selby, Shaw, & Houtz, 2005). Traditionaler up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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creative people who are more energized by the sheer enjoyment of
the work itself or by external recognition for their work rather than
purely material things (Amabile, 1989). Many innovative orga-
nizations reward creative employees with prizes (the most
extreme being HP’s Medal of Deﬁance once conferred by David
Packard), but some creative employees might be uninterested and
unmotivated by the prospect of such recognition (Packard, 1995).
Sadly, there is also evidence of an association between creative
achievement and susceptibility to severe mental illnesses such as
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Higher rates of both creativity,
mental illness and suicide have emerged in many occupational
samples (Claridge & Blakey, 2009; Jamison, 1995; Ludwig, 1994;
Schildkraut & Otero, 1996), including samples from non-artistic
ﬁelds (Post, 1994). A qualitative analysis of 1005 biographies
showed a positive correlation between severe psychopathology
and magnitude of creative achievement (Ludwig, 1995). There is
even evidence that both creativity and mental illness might be
heritable. For instance, children separated early from schizophren-
ic mothers and reared in adopted families had 50% higher rates of
both creative achievement and schizophrenia (Heston, 1966). A
more recent study compared adoptees whose parents had
schizophrenia to control adoptees with no history and found
adoptees with a family history but no disorder were rated by
outside judges as more creative than adoptees with no family
history and no disorder (Kinney et al., 2001). What explains this
association? It is possible that some symptoms of mental illness,
like allusive or over-inclusive thinking, might resemble the kinds of
thought processes that are characteristic of creative cognition, like
the ability to make unusual associations between concepts and the
ability to connect seemingly disparate pieces of information. What
this means for organizations is that creative professionals might be
susceptible to mental illnesses, raising healthcare costs and
possibly contributing to higher rates of turnover and absenteeism,
thus raising the cost of pursuing creative goals.
In sum, creative people are known for questioning and breaking
norms (Nemeth, 1986; Nemeth & Staw, 1989). They are described
as egocentric, impulsive, and risk-taking (Amabile, 1989; Eysenck,
1993; Gough, 1979; Selby et al., 2005). They regularly engage in
task conﬂict with their colleagues (Nemeth, Personnaz, Personnaz,
& Goncalo, 2004) as they openly disagree with and compete
against them (Beersma & De Dreu, 2005; Cummings & Oldham,
1997; Munkes & Diehl, 2003; Shalley & Oldham, 1997). This
disruptive behavior can spark creativity, but it can also be costly to
manage.
Given their characteristics, it is unclear how unruly creatives
would ﬁt with the culture of most organizations. Organizations
beneﬁt from having a strong culture in which norms and values are
strongly held and widely shared (Chatman & O’Reilly, 2016). Strong
organizational cultures are advantageous because they can sustain
employee commitment and motivation (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1996;
Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005). Therefore, orga-
nizations with strong cultures try to hire people who hold similar
values to their own as these newcomers are easily socialized into
the ﬁrm’s culture (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005; O’Reilly, Chatman, &
Caldwell, 1991). Person-organization ﬁt is valuable because it
reduces turnover and boosts cooperation (O’Reilly et al., 1991).
Creative people likely react against a strong culture to assert their
independence and perhaps even weaken the existing culture if
they manage to convince others to follow their lead (Goncalo &
Duguid, 2012).
If creativity is the desired goal, it might be more effective to
avoid creative people entirely. In an experiment, Goncalo and
Duguid (2012) showed that it is possible to make uncreative
personalities voice signiﬁcantly more creative ideas in a brain-
storming session by introducing a social norm that is appropriatePlease cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
creativity and innovation, Research in Organizational Behavior (2018), hto the task of being creative (e.g., individualism) and then
reinforcing that norm with the overt threat of social sanctions.
Intriguingly, the level of creative output, both in terms of sheer
numbers and rated creativity was the same for teams of highly
creative people working under weak norms compared to less
creative people working under strong norms. Thus, it is possible to
leverage social inﬂuence to prod less creative people into achieving
creative outcomes and thus avoid the considerable costs of
recruiting and managing creative personalities.
Resistance to creative leadership
The desire for creative employees has even traveled to the
upper echelons of many ﬁrms. According to a recent survey of 1500
chief executives, conducted by IBM’s Institute for Business Value,
CEOs identify “creativity,” the ability to generate novel and useful
solutions, as the most important leadership competency for the
successful organization of the future (Kern, 2010). Creativity helps
leaders move organizations in proﬁtable new directions, a view
supported by management research showing that leaders with
creative ability are more effective at promoting positive change
and inspiring their followers than leaders who lack creative ability
(House & Howell, 1992; Mumford & Connelly, 1991; Mumford,
Marks, Connelly, Zaccaro, & Reiter-Palmon, 2000; Shin & Zhou,
2003; Shin & Zhou, 2007; Sternberg, 2007; Tierney, Farmer, &
Graen, 1999; Yukl, 1989).
Despite the desire for and beneﬁt of creative employees and
particularly leaders, growing evidence suggests that creative
people can generate impressions that are not entirely positive.
In other words, people form impressions and make judgments
about others based on the kinds of ideas they express. One might
assume that pitching a creative idea would generate favorable
impressions, given how desirable creative ideas allegedly are. Yet,
individuals who pitch creative ideas are viewed as quirky,
unpredictable and unconventional (Elsbach & Kramer, 2003). In
some industries such as product design, ﬁlm, marketing and
venture capital funding, these are favorable impressions (Elsbach &
Kramer, 2003). Generally though, they are not. Consequently,
creative people can be ﬁltered out on the way to the top. For
example, one study showed that employees who pitch a creative
idea may be viewed as having less leadership potential than
employees who share an idea that is purely practical (Mueller,
Goncalo, & Kamdar, 2011). This happens because prototypes of
“creative people” and “effective leaders” may sometimes clash in
the minds of evaluators. The most prototypical kind of leader is
expected to organize and coordinate groups to diminish uncer-
tainty and promote order by emphasizing shared goals (Phillips &
Lord, 1981). The prototypical leader is also expected to conform to
group norms and goals in order to symbolically support the group
identity (van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, De Cremer, & Hogg,
2004) and to promote collective action (Lord, Foti, & de Vader,
1984). Individuals who behave in ways that convey these
characteristics to others are readily categorized as ﬁtting the
leadership prototype.
Far from matching fundamental leadership expectations
associated with exuding control and promoting clear goals, the
expression of creative solutions may actually introduce ambiguity
or uncertainty, because novel ideas involve deviations from the
status quo and are not yet proven (Amabile, 1996; Staw, 1995).
Prototype theory conﬁrms this view that the expression of creative
ideas is often associated with uncertainty, nonconformity,
unorthodoxy, and unconventionality (Elsbach & Kramer, 2003;
Sternberg, 1985) – traits which run contrary to deeply rooted
expectations that prototypical leaders diminish uncertainty and
provide normative order (Phillips & Lord, 1981). The bias against
creative leadership is consistent with a number of ﬁndings in theer up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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from the majority (Hogg, 2001) or who are much more intelligent
than their followers (Antonakis, House, & Simonton, 2017;
Simonton, 1985) are unlikely to be chosen as leaders. People also
think traits that seemingly run counter to creativity, like
consistency, are a good sign of leadership (Staw & Ross, 1980)
while traits that might stimulate creativity, like cognitive
complexity, are bad for leadership (Tetlock, Peterson, & Berry,
1993). Traits like agreeableness and sociability are not often
associated with creativity but they are good for group and
organizational functioning (Miron-Spektor, Erez, & Naveh, 2011).
An important implication of this mismatch between creativity
and leadership is that organizations may face a bias against
selecting the most creative individuals as leaders in favor of
selecting leaders who will preserve the status quo by sticking with
feasible but relatively unoriginal solutions. This may explain why,
in their analysis of scores of leaders, IBM’s Institute for Business
Value found that many leaders expressed doubt or lack of
conﬁdence in their own ability to lead through times of complexity
(Kern, 2010). If the dominant prototype of leadership favors useful,
non-creative responses, then the senior leaders in the IBM study
may have been promoted based on this prototypical perception of
leadership and now ﬁnd themselves in a world that has vastly
changed – one that requires much more creative responses and
thinking than they are comfortable with. This bias in favor of
selecting less creative leaders may partially explain why so many
leaders fail (Hogan & Hogan, 2001), and why so many groups resist
change (Argyris, 1997; Mueller, 2017), as the leaders selected may
simply lack the openness to recognize solutions that depart from
what is already known.
In sum, though organizations claim to welcome creative ideas,
employees and leaders, feelings of uncertainty may push
evaluators to reject creativity because it can be perceived as
threatening. Because of this bias, people who attempt to be
creative should know they are doing so at a considerable cost to
their reputations and to their careers.
Side effects of creativity
In the last section, we noted the direct costs of creative action.
Because of a deeply rooted, though rarely acknowledged bias
against creativity, openly expressing a creative idea can have
immediate, negative consequences. In this section, we turn to the
potential indirect side-effects of actively engaging in the creative
process. Obviously, undertaking the effort to develop creative ideas
will increase the odds of yielding creative outcomes, but here we
think more broadly about the other unintended consequences that
might arise as a by-product of being creative. In particular, we look
at the following types of positive and negative side effects: (a)
creative disinhibition; (b) stereotype reduction, (c) social connec-
tion, and (d) creative inﬂation.
Creative disinhibition
Drawing on the theory of behavioral disinhibition, we offer a
framework for thinking about the potential side effects of engaging
in the creative process. Disinhibition (the opposite of latent
inhibition) is deﬁned as the loss of control over one’s behaviors,
thoughts, or emotions (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Ward
& Mann, 2000). To cite a classic example, disinhibition occurs if a
person who is on a diet—one that restricts caloric intake—loses
self-control and binges on cake or some other high calorie food
(Ward & Mann, 2000). In developing our framework, we suggest
that creativity and behavioral disinhibition are intertwined.
Behavioral disinhibition cannot only lead to creativity, but being
creative can also produce feelings of disinhibition that will, in turn,Please cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
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which we deﬁne as an intuitive, subconscious driven way of
thinking, behaving or feeling that is brought about by working on
creative tasks or engaging in the creative process. Creative
disinhibition will have unintended side-effects on a potentially
wide range of important work outcomes, both positive and
negative. In other words, the creative process may, in and of itself,
trigger a particular mindset that could, in turn, have downstream
consequences.
Disinhibition leads to creativity
The ability to inhibit is generally a desirable skill that, for
example, prevents people from blurting out inappropriate com-
ments to others and helps to ﬁlter out irrelevant responses (Lubow,
1989). Yet, disinhibition may also stimulate creative problem
solving. Disinhibition allows problem solvers to associate seem-
ingly unrelated ideas (Mednick, 1962) and it facilitates idea
generation ﬂuency (Gascon & Kaufman, 2010). Disinhibition can be
advantageous for creative tasks because it allows people to voice
all of their ideas freely, particularly the most novel ideas that are
initially strange and that would otherwise be withheld for fear of
rejection (Camacho & Paulus, 1995).
Many of the interventions intended to stimulate creativity
operate by disinhibiting problem solvers in some way. Oppor-
tunities for play (Feldhusen & Hobson, 1972; Mainemelis & Ronson,
2006), anonymity (Sosik, Kahai, Avolio, & 1999) and even moderate
alcohol consumption (Norlander, 1999) all disinhibit people,
prompting them to consider and voice a wider range of potential
solutions that might otherwise be dismissed as too impractical or
risky (Mueller et al., 2012). In other words, disinhibition opens the
funnel that allows problem solvers to consider more information
and more disparate information that can then be combined in
novel ways (Staw, 1990). That may explain why disinhibition is
strongly correlated with high creative achievement only in
combination with high IQ—disinhibited problem solvers might
need a high level of intelligence to cope with the large amount of
information they attend to during creative problem solving
(Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2003; Gascon & Kaufman, 2010).
Being creative leads to disinhibition
On the ﬂip side, we suggest it is also possible that actively
engaging in the creative process will cause disinhibition. The
creative process is multi-faceted and includes activities like
generating ideas that diverge in multiple directions, connecting
pieces of information that are seemingly disparate and changing
perspectives to see old problems from a new point of view (Cronin
& Loewenstein, 2018). Though little direct evidence exists, there
are at least two mechanisms through which engaging in the
creative process might activate feelings of disinhibition. First,
doing creative work can be cognitively taxing and it is likely to
deplete cognitive resources (Roskes, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2012).
Creative problem solvers might then be less able to devote
sufﬁcient resources toward maintaining self-control, thus be-
coming disinhibited. Second, the process of being creative can
also involve a disregard for social norms, conventions, and
concerns as creative people frequently break from the status quo
and regularly call existing solutions into question (Kim, Vincent, &
Goncalo, 2013). Some organizations, like Hewlett-Packard, have
encouraged this positive rule breaking in order to foster creativity
(Nemeth, 1997). Actively participating in the process of rebelling
against convention can, over time, reduce social desirability
concerns and produce feelings of disinhibition (Hirsh, Galinsky, &
Zhong, 2011). These processes might occur simultaneously as
creative problem solvers are both cognitively taxed and actively
being rebellious—activities that can be disinhibiting either alone
or in combination.er up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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tested directly, but there is some intriguing supportive evidence
from recent research. In an experiment, participants were asked to
complete a brainstorming task, with one group randomly assigned
to generate creative solutions and the other to generate practical
solutions to a problem (Goncalo, Vincent, & Krause, 2015). In a
subsequent survey, participants who had been randomly assigned
to spend ten minutes generating creative ideas reported feeling
more (a) liberated, (b) uninhibited, and (c) unconstrained
compared to participants who had generated practical solu-
tions—feelings that are highly consistent with disinhibition.
Disinhibition did not result when participants were restricted to
brainstorming around one particular category of ideas, suggesting
that it is the ability to freely explore alternatives that produces
disinhibition.
Consequences of creative disinhibition in organizations
There are several advantages of viewing the consequences of
creativity through the lens of disinhibition. First, disinhibition can
tie together and explain existing ﬁndings on the consequences of
creativity, currently sparse and scattered, under one framework.
Second, the effects of disinhibition are broad, including a mix of
both positive and negative outcomes (Amodio, Master, Yee, &
Taylor, 2008). Third, and most importantly, linking creativity to
disinhibition leads to a number of possible directions for future
research. Below we review and theorize about the positive and
negative side effects of creative disinhibition in organizations.
Positive side effects of creative disinhibition
There may be positive consequences of disinhibition for
psychological well-being. For example, engaging in the creative
process can lift or ease psychological burdens, like the burden
associated with concealing a big secret (Goncalo et al., 2015).
Maintaining a secret is not only experienced as a psychological
burden but also as a physical burden. Secrets can literally feel like
one is carrying a heavy weight (Slepian, Masicampo, Toosi, &
Ambady, 2012). This is because abstract concepts like secrecy can
become intertwined with physical experiences like physical
burden and eventually attain a reality of their own (Barsalou,
2008).
There are many other examples of this psychological phenom-
enon. Take, for instance, the notion that people can be either “cold”
or “warm.” “Cold” and “warm” refer to both physical experiences
and to psychologically potent metaphors for personality. Because
the metaphor and the physical experience are meshed together,
people can actually rate a stranger’s personality as warmer when
holding a warm as opposed to a cold beverage (Williams & Bargh,
2008). Similarly, walking backwards can cue memories of the past,
while walking forward can cue thoughts about the future (Miles,
Nind, & Macrae, 2010). Through this process, keeping a secret can
have real physical consequences. For instance, people keeping a big
secret think and behave as though they are shouldering a physical
burden. Secret keepers can overestimate the steepness of a hill
(because hills seem steeper when you are feeling weighted down)
or the weight of a common object (because objects also feel heavier
when you are feeling weighted down) (Slepian et al., 2012).
Engaging in creative work may provide a way to overcome those
burdens of secrecy without disclosing information that one either
cannot disclose or chooses not to disclose. In a laboratory
experiment, participants were asked to think of a big or small
secret they keep, and they were then assigned a brainstorming task
with the instruction to generate either “creative” or “practical”
solutions depending on the condition to which they were
randomly assigned (Goncalo et al., 2015). After completing the
brainstorming task, participants were asked to help carry heavyPlease cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
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so the experimenter supposedly needed help moving the books.
People who feel physically burdened should offer to help move
fewer stacks of books. Indeed, the participants who were asked to
keep a big secret but did not have a creative outlet offered to move
signiﬁcantly fewer books than the secret keepers who were given a
creative outlet. The latter participants offered to move as many
books as the participants who were not keeping a big secret. In
other words, holding a big secret causes physical labor to seem
more effortful, but this burden was lifted after doing creative work
(Goncalo et al., 2015).
The ﬁndings of this experiment also pointed to the underlying
process that explains why creative work lifts the burden of secrecy.
The unburdening effect of doing creative work was fully mediated
by self-reported disinhibition. In other words, people who kept a
big secret reported that generating creative ideas gave them a
general feeling of being disinhibited and those feelings of
disinhibition, in turn, predicted their willingness to help on tasks
that would otherwise be too physically taxing.
Thus, disinhibition might be a useful framework for explaining
the positive consequences of creative work. Keeping secrets can
make people feel socially isolated and may even exact a physical
toll. The challenge in managing the consequences of secrecy is that
employees cannot always be expected to simply divulge. Some
secrets are too personal to share. However, doing creative work,
because it permits people to freely explore a wide range of different
ideas can offer psychological refuge to employees who are
constrained to withhold their true selves from others.
Negative side effects of creative disinhibition
Creative disinhibition may also have a dark side, as it is likely to
reduce the self-control necessary to follow norms and rules –
something that could be either positive or negative depending on
the context. Disinhibition might be positive in situations that
demand creative solutions because it might motivate people to
rebel against the status quo – breaking the “rules” that might
ordinarily constrain creative thought. However, creativity has also
been linked to anti-social forms of rule breaking such as dishonesty
and theft (Gino & Ariely, 2012). Creative people are more likely to
lie, cheat and steal than their less creative peers – and this
tendency toward dishonest behavior occurs even when creativity
is induced with a situational prime (Gino & Ariely, 2012).
Why are creative people more dishonest? Existing research
suggests creativity may directly enable dishonesty by giving
people the cognitive ﬂexibility to reframe their dishonest acts as
morally acceptable (Gino & Ariely, 2012; Mazar & Ariely, 2006).
Cognitive ﬂexibility or the ability to easily switch from one
perspective to another is considered to be a necessary antecedent
of creativity (Nijstad et al., 2010). Nevertheless, this ability may
also help people morally disengage from their actions (e.g., I was
not stealing that pen, I was just borrowing it) (Vincent, Emich &
Goncalo, 2013). Yet, this dark side of creativity may also be
parsimoniously explained by behavioral disinhibition—being
creative can sap people of the self-control necessary to identify
an act as immoral and to resist the temptation to engage in it (Gino,
Schweitzer, Meade, & Ariely, 2011).
Creative disinhibition might also explain another intriguing
ﬁnding about the consequences of creativity – work-life imbalance
(Harrison & Wagner, 2016). Anecdotal evidence suggests that
highly creative people are very self-absorbed. For example, Elon
Musk is completely absorbed with his work and expects employees
to follow suit, “If you want a family or hobbies or to see any other
aspect of life other than the boundaries of your cubicle, SpaceX is
not for you and Elon doesn't give a damn” (engineer at SpaceX
quoted in Feloni, 2014). Recent empirical evidence suggests that
Elon Musk is not unusual, but rather his behavior is part of a largerer up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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signiﬁcantly and negatively predicts the amount of time an
individual spends with his or her spouse at home (Harrison &
Wagner, 2016). Interestingly, it was only variance-focused creative
behaviors (e.g., idea generation) that produced this negative effect,
not selection-focused behaviors (e.g., idea evaluation). It is possible
that limited time spent with one’s spouse reﬂects a kind of
workaholism – a self-control failure that might prevent a worker
from disengaging from tasks they ﬁnd absorbing, challenging and
enjoyable (Spence & Robbins, 1992). For example, doing creative
work can boost subsequent task engagement, intrinsic motivation
and long-term knowledge retention (Conti, Amabile, & Pollack,
1995). Variance-focused creative work might produce this effect
because it allows for the kind of wide-ranging and uncontrolled
exploration that produces disinhibition (Goncalo et al., 2015).
The study of creative disinhibition may also open numerous
avenues for future research on counter-productive, even anti-
social work behavior. For example, creative disinhibition might
contribute to greater aggression at work, particularly among
employees who might be low in trait self-control (DeWall,
Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007). Many jobs nowadays are
unstructured and thus require self-structuring, which in turn,
requires an immense amount of consistent self-control. However,
the various forms of temptation made possible by the internet such
as Facebook, online-shopping, various instant messengers and the
like, which are easily accessible at work, wear on our self-control.
Once self-control is diminished, disinhibition (depleted self-
control) easily leads to and is almost synonymous with procrasti-
nation (see Steel, 2007 for a meta-analytic review), which is
deﬁned as the “[voluntary delay of an] intended course of action
despite expecting to be worse off for the delay” (Steel, 2007: 66). In
other words, allowing workers to be creative might give rise to
negative side effects that might prove costly in the long run.
Disinhibition increases the temptation to consume alcohol and
also leads to higher alcohol consumption (Muraven & Shmueli,
2006). For example, disinhibition led male social drinkers to
consume signiﬁcantly more alcohol in a “taste test” even when
they knew that they had to perform a driving test immediately
afterwards (Muraven, Collins, & Nienhaus, 2002). In a diary study,
underage participants who experienced disinhibition (via high
demands on their self-control resources) consumed alcohol above
their personally imposed limits (Muraven, Collins, Shiffman, &
Paty, 2005). Disinhibition also leads people to choose unhealthy,
tempting foods over healthy foods in food-tasting tests (Vohs &
Heatherton, 2000). Regularly giving in to high calorie foods can
lead to weight gain and ultimately to obesity, which has a number
of health consequences that prevent employees from working
regularly (Cawley, Rizzo & Haas, 2007; Tucker & Friedman, 1998).
There is preliminary evidence to suggest that doing creative
work might cause people to overindulge through disinhibition. In a
recent study, participants were asked to spend time brainstorming
either creative or practical ideas and then move on to a subsequent
and unrelated decision making task. In the subsequent task,
participants were asked to decide on the toppings they would use
to construct a burger they would like to eat. Preliminary results
have shown that being creative on a prior task caused people to
overindulge by not only choosing more toppings but also making
burgers that were signiﬁcantly more caloric (Vincent, Krause, &
Goncalo, 2018). This effect occurred even though participants had
no information about the actual creativity or quality of their ideas,
thus suggesting that this effect might emerge because of a loss of
self-control rather than rewarding oneself for a job well done.
Given these initial ﬁndings, future research might also investigate
the possibility that individuals who do creative work might be
susceptible to alcohol and substance abuse on or off the job
(Bacharach, Bamberger, & Sonnenstuhl, 2002).Please cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
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On a more positive note, creativity also has the potential to
reduce stereotyping. In an experiment, participants were primed
to be either “creative” or “thoughtful” by listing three concrete
examples of a time they exempliﬁed either behavior (Sassenberg &
Moskowitz, 2005). The results showed that participants who were
primed to be creative were, in a subsequent task, less likely to
stereotype an outgroup member compared to participants who
were primed to be thoughtful (Sassenberg & Moskowitz, 2005).
Because the concept of creativity invokes the goal of avoiding
conventional ways of thinking, it also has the potential to interfere
with the automatic reliance on stereotypes by encouraging people
to think different (Sassenberg & Moskowitz, 2005).
Creativity fosters social connection
Another recent study suggests that creative acts might provide
a foundation for reducing loneliness and encouraging social
bonding at work. In a series of studies, participants were asked
to either generate creative or uncreative ideas for new products
(candle scents and potato chip ﬂavors) and at the end, they were
asked about their feelings of self-disclosure (Goncalo & Katz, 2018).
The results show that generating creative products caused
participants to feel as though they disclosed something very
personal about themselves. In a follow-up study, dyads were asked
to generate creative or uncreative ideas and then share those ideas
with their partners. It was found that partners not only felt as
though they shared something personal about themselves, but also
that, in the process of being creative, they also learned something
personal about their partner (Goncalo & Katz, 2018).
Self-disclosure may, in turn, foster the formation of meaningful
relationships at work. There is a strong link between self-
disclosure and social connection for three reasons. First, people
who disclose more are more liked by others. Second, people tend to
disclose more about themselves to those whom they like more.
Third, people like those to whom they disclose more (Collins &
Miller, 1994). Through this process, self-disclosure can lead to an
upward cycle of relationship building. A person begins to disclose
to another, which causes him to like that other person more, which
then causes him to disclose more to that person and so on. Because
people who do creative work reveal their personal identities,
interests and passions, other people might be emboldened to
respond in kind – a process that can strengthen relationships over
time. In other words, self-disclosure is not simply a way to develop
intimacy in and increase the strength of existing relationships, but
it can also form the basis for and even strengthen new relation-
ships that previously did not exist at all. Self-disclosure can
decrease loneliness, by supporting the formation of new relation-
ships with others. One person discloses more to others, which then
causes those others to disclose back, which generally increases
liking between people at a variety of different stages and
strengthens the relationship. Self-disclosure is not a one-way
street. Indeed, self-disclosure from one party encourages self-
disclosure from the other (Jourard, 1971). Different disclosure
levels from one partner directly predict disclosure levels of the
other partner, regardless of initial levels of liking (Derlega, Harris, &
Chaikin, 1973). These cycles of reciprocal self-disclosure can
gradually increase liking of even previously unacquainted partners
(Sprecher, Treger, Wondra, Hilaire, & Wallpe, 2013).
Creative work can be an impetus for self-disclosure. While it
may be inappropriate or even bizarre to share deeply personal
information in a work setting, doing so in the context of creative
work might allow personal information to be shared within the
context of a professional relationship. As people share their
passion through their work, they reveal themselves to others ander up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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loneliness.
Creativity, competition and creative inﬂation
Creative ideas are often sparked by competition either within
(Goncalo & Krause, 2010) or between organizations (Baer,
Leenders, Oldham & Vadera, 2010). Competition can encourage
people and groups to engage in a process of upward social
comparison that inspires individuals to one-up each other in an
effort to suggest ideas that stand out as increasingly more creative
(Dugosh & Paulus, 2005; Sutton & Hargaddon, 1996). Such creative
inﬂation can cause ideas that are initially regarded as highly
creative to become taken for granted (Cropley, Kaufman & Cropley,
2008). Creative inﬂation can cause a shift in standards used to
evaluate creative ideas, as such standards are not ﬁxed but rather
highly malleable depending on the context (Loewenstein &
Mueller, 2016; Mueller et al., 2014). As the overall level of
creativity in a team or an organization increases, the harder it will
be to stand out from the crowd, as the bar for judging an idea as
“creative” gets higher and higher. This process should spur ever-
rising levels of creativity in an organization. However, rising
standards in the context of ﬁerce competition could also produce
feelings of emotional exhaustion, cynicism and inefﬁcacy that are
hallmarks of job burnout among employees (Maslach, 2003). And,
creative competition can also have another negative side effect.
Competitive norms can turn toxic if employees are encouraged to
be jealous, overly aggressive and willing to lash out at co-workers
in creative ways (Harris & Reiter-Palmon, 2015). Competitive
efforts can even have a broader effect on organizational culture if it
inspires malevolent forms of creativity – creativity aimed at doing
others harm, being cruel or inciting destruction (Cropley et al.,
2008).
Long-term consequences of creativity
Even if organizations manage the inherent costs of creativity
and the side effects, there may still be signiﬁcant downstream
negative consequences of creativity on long-term work perfor-
mance. We discuss three major mechanisms behind these negative
consequences: (a) the formation of a creative identity; (b) traps of
past creative success, and (c) the erosion of standards used to
evaluate new ideas.
Formation of a creative identity
Creative people may form personal identities that inﬂate their
sense of importance and make them feel entitled to special
treatment at work. A creative personal identity is deﬁned as the
overall importance a person places on being creative as part of his
or her self-deﬁnition (Jaussi, Randel, & Dionne, 2007). Supervisors’
expectations (Scott & Bruce 1994), coworker support and
interaction (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Zhou
& George, 2001) and creativity relevant norms (Goncalo & Duguid,
2012) can activate a creative identity at work. Individuals with a
creative identity feel motivated to act in ways that are in line with
the positive self-concept of a creative individual (Petkus, 1996).
Existing research on the creative identity has focused on its
consequences for creative performance. People with a creative
identity may actually perform more creatively because they are
motivated to maintain and support that identity, even if they do
not necessarily have more creative talent than their peers (Jaussi
et al., 2007; Lemons 2010).
>Yet, the consequences of a creative identity are not necessarily
positive if one considers a broader set of outcomes than just
creative performance. Vincent and Kouchaki (2016) argue that onePlease cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
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entitlement, because the ability to be creative is typically regarded
as a rare and valuable attribute (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline,
& Bushman, 2004). In a series of studies, Vincent and Kouchaki
(2016) found that making a creative identity salient by asking
people to recall and write about a time they solved a problem
creatively (as opposed to logically) triggers feelings of entitlement
– the perception that one is owed more than others. Moreover,
feelings of entitlement had some surprisingly negative conse-
quences. In a subsequent task, participants were asked to solve a
series of problems while seated alone. The experimenter asked
participants to grade the problems themselves using an answer
key, to write down the number of correct solutions solved and to
pay themselves the correct amount of money before leaving the
experiment. All participants were told that their true answers were
completely anonymous when in fact they could be traced using a
code that was written at the top of each sheet in invisible ink. The
results of this experiment were striking. Participants primed to
think of themselves as creative were not only more likely to lie
about how many answers they solved correctly, but they also stole
signiﬁcantly more money. Furthermore, the relationship between
creative identity and dishonesty was fully mediated by feelings of
entitlement – creativity makes me special, so I am rightfully owed
more than everyone else. Organizations that desire creativity are
then faced with a double-edged sword – encouraging a creative
identity encourages employees to be more creative, but it could
also license them to steal with impunity (Vincent & Goncalo, 2014).
Future research might expand on the insight that viewing
oneself as a creative individual triggers feelings of entitlement.
Entitlement has been linked to a number of outcomes that might
be dysfunctional in organizational settings such as selﬁshness
(Campbell et al., 2004; Zitek, Jordan, Monin & Leach, 2010), a
diminished sense of social responsibility (Watson & Morris, 1991)
and the willingness to demand unreasonably high salaries
(Campbell et al., 2004). These potential costs of the creative
identity should be considered along with the potential beneﬁts of
cultivating creative ideas.
Traps of past creative success
Here we consider the rather perverse possibility that prior
creative success may actually stiﬂe subsequent creative achieve-
ment (Audia & Goncalo, 2007; Goncalo, Vincent, & Audia, 2010).
Once a creative solution has been identiﬁed, an employee is likely
to prefer exploitation over exploration, because exploitation of
existing knowledge that has proven to be effective guarantees
more certain results and therefore reduces the risk that their
efforts will lead to dead ends (Levinthal & March, 1993; March,
1991).
Yet, prior creative performance may operate as a constraint on
the process of generating novel ideas by focusing an employee’s
attention excessively on the building blocks of creativity (e.g.,
ideas, knowledge) that have already been used in the past. In other
words, the tendency to focus on what we know can facilitate
productivity, while simultaneously blocking the broadminded
exploration of novel solutions. Every person working in a given
ﬁeld is faced with an enormous array of information that may be
combined and recombined until a particular idea is deemed to be
worthy of “selection” (Campbell, 1960; Csikszentmihalyi, 1999).
However, once an employee experiences success with one idea, all
subsequent ideas may be framed narrowly from that perspective.
For example, Audia and Goncalo (2007) show that, although
inventors who successfully generated and patented their inven-
tions in the past tend to generate a greater number of inventions in
the future, these inventions become more incremental and less
signiﬁcant.er up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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least in part, by the phenomenon of cognitive framing, which
suggests that when people have experienced success with a
particular strategy, they often become narrowly focused on
implementing that strategy to solve new problems (Duncker,
1945; Luchins, 1942). This type of mental block is called negative
transfer (Bartlett, 1958) and it has been found to deter the
generation of novel solutions in a variety of situations, such as
negotiations over time (Bereby-Meyer, Moran & Unger-Aviram,
2004), factory operation after a change in accident monitoring
devices (Besnard & Cacitti, 2005), ﬁrms acquiring targets from
different industries (Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002), and ﬁrms
changing their strategies following a radical environmental change
(Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000).
People store a wealth of information in the form of ideas or
concepts, and creative solutions emerge when pieces of prior
knowledge stored in memory are combined in novel ways (Audia &
Goncalo, 2007). Ward (1994) demonstrated the constraining
effects of experience on creativity in a study, in which he asked
participants to draw an alien from another planet that was “beyond
their wildest imagination.” Instead of drawing radically different
creatures, participants drew ﬁgures that conformed to the basic
features of earth animals, such as, bilateral symmetry (Ward,
1994).
The constraining effect of past experience was also demon-
strated in a brainstorming study, in which subjects were asked to
generate new ideas; half the subjects were given an example to get
them started and the other half were given no examples (Smith,
Ward, & Schumacher, 1993). Groups that were given examples
generated less creative ideas than the groups that were given no
examples because their “new” ideas followed the examples too
closely (Smith et al., 1993). These blocking effects may have
considerable negative consequences for creative idea generation
because people will suggest ideas that follow existing solutions too
closely (Audia & Goncalo, 2007). In other words, a highly creative
idea will constrain future creativity because all subsequent ideas
will be framed narrowly from the perspective of the initial, highly
salient, creative idea. In sum, creativity can be constraining in the
long run. Ideas are not merely problem solutions; they are tied to
our sense of self: they send reputational signals and they provide a
point of view on the world from which it can be difﬁcult to break
away.
Early creativity can undermine subsequent idea evaluation and
selection
Organizations that successfully manage the creative process
will ideally encourage employees to generate a wide range of ideas
and solutions. However, it is impossible to turn every idea, even
every truly creative idea, into a commercialized invention. Rather,
organizations are faced with the task of choosing which ideas will
be pursued to fruition – a practical reality that requires the
accurate evaluation and selection of one or a few ideas and the
rejection of others. Though most research on creativity has focused
on ideation, there is growing evidence that idea evaluation is
extremely challenging. In a number of experimental studies,
neither interactive groups, in which the group members brain-
storm together, nor nominal groups, in which the group members
brainstorm individually and to then combine their ideas, selected
an idea that was better than their average idea (Faure, 2004;
Putman & Paulus, 2009; Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2006;
Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2010).
One reason that evaluators fail to accurately identify their most
creative ideas is confusion over what standard to apply when
making their selection. Rather than establishing clear standards
and applying those standards to make a judgment, evaluators fallPlease cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
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ideas. For example, idea evaluators can be self-serving – favoring
their own ideas over the superior ideas suggested by others (Keum
& See, 2017). Evaluators can also be misled by superﬁcial cues such
as conﬁdence (Goncalo, Flynn, & Kim, 2010), the pitcher’s sex and
physical attractiveness (Hosoda, Stone-Romero, & Coats, 2003;
Marlowe, Schneider, & Nelson, 1996), thus giving conﬁdent and
attractive men an unfair advantage in the evaluation process. Ideas
generated early during a brainstorming session are favored over
ideas that are generated late even though they are not necessarily
better (Johnson & D’Lauro, 2018). These problems might stem from
confusion over the meaning and deﬁnition of creativity in the real
world. Among lay people, creativity is associated with myriad
other broadly positive concepts such as happiness, high tech, and
fashionable, among others (Loewenstein & Mueller, 2016).
Additionally, Eastern cultures have a different implicit theory of
what is creative than Western cultures, thus compounding the
confusion that results when people from different cultures
evaluate each other’s ideas (Loewenstein & Mueller, 2016).
Moreover, given a wide range of creative ideas, selecting one or
a few ideas to pursue to the next stage necessarily involves
discussion and compromise. Rather than strongly advocating in
favor of highly creative ideas, it might be tempting to lower
standards and compromise by selecting relatively unoriginal
ideas—ideas that are less likely to generate controversy (Goncalo
& Staw, 2006).
Organizations that attempt to foster creativity may inadver-
tently exacerbate the confusion that makes idea evaluation and
selection so challenging. In order to spark creativity, organizations
try to permit a wide range of people, perspectives and approaches
to doing work, because all of this diversity can be a resource in the
creative process. The result might be a wide range of creative ideas
and a litany of different perspectives, but no remaining paradigm
from which to judge them (Kuhn, 1970). It is counterproductive to
have many ideas but no clear consensus around what constitutes a
creative idea (Rietzschel et al., 2006). Prescriptions intended to
boost creativity such as ensuring equal participation of all
members, do not criticize anyone else’s ideas, allow for deviance
and welcome misﬁts (Goncalo, Katz, & Ellis, 2018), are in direct
contrast to the prescriptions intended to strengthen paradigm
development – build consensus, allow elites to set the standard
and eliminate deviant perspectives (Pfeffer, 1993). In other words,
the factors that boost creative output, like welcoming deviant
perspectives, might undermine the eventual selection of a creative
idea by impeding paradigm development. Conversely, groups with
strong paradigms might be positioned to make sound evaluations
but they may have an uncreative pool of ideas from which to make
their selection. By the time highly creative teams turn to idea
selection, the stage may have already been set for failure.
What is the cost of creativity?
In sum, although creativity may spark new and valuable ideas,
which can lead to invention, innovation, progress, and proﬁt
(Amabile & Pratt, 2016), we challenge the assumption that creative
work is inherently positive by showing in three sections that
creativity has both positive and negative consequences. In our ﬁrst
section, we summarize research showing that even though
decision-makers in organizations claim to want creative ideas,
employees, and leadership, they are in fact biased against them
because creative ideas are risky and uncertain (Mueller et al.,
2012), and the prototype of a creative person is in direct opposition
to the prototype of a leader (Mueller et al., 2011). Thus, creativity is
not as welcome as assumed. In our second section, we develop a
theory of creative disinhibition. We argue that engaging in creative
work disinhibits employees, which feels liberating and liftser up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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unethical behavior (Gino & Ariely, 2012) and work-life imbalance
(Harrison & Wagner, 2016). Furthermore, while engaging in
creative work can reduce stereotyping (Sassenberg & Moskowitz,
2005) and foster social connections (Goncalo & Katz, 2018), it may
also increase competition and the expectation of ever-rising
creativity. In our third section, we discuss three long-term
consequences of creativity. First, the formation of an enduring
creative identity can lead to entitlement and dishonesty (Vincent &
Kouchaki, 2016). Second, past creative success may encourage
exploitation and discourage further exploration (Audia & Goncalo,
2007). Third, just because creative ideas are generated does not
automatically mean that employees are able to recognize them as
such and select the most creative idea for implementation
(Rietzschel et al., 2010; Keum & See, 2017). In sum, though many
organizations actively recruit creative people on the assumption
that their potential future inventions will generate revenue and
proﬁt, they may not be aware that adding and nurturing these
creative people might also make the organization more vulnerable
to dishonesty, theft, broken homes, substance abuse and unhealthy
overindulgence.
EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF INNOVATION
Innovation as an Independent Variable
Our analysis of the consequences of creativity uncovered a
number of possible negative outcomes, from outright rejection of
creative ideas and creative people, to psychological side effects
such as anti-social and unhealthy behavior. Given these costs, the
odds that a creative idea will develop into a valuable invention and
then into an innovation successfully introduced to market are low
(Harvey, 2014). When a ﬁrm does manage to successfully transition
from a creative idea to invention to innovation, it is widely
assumed that innovation beneﬁts will far outweigh the costs. Much
like the creativity literature, the notion that innovation is beneﬁcial
for organizational performance and survival is widespread and
almost taken-for-granted. But is this notion well-grounded?
Are the effects of innovation on ﬁrm performance always positive?
The management of innovation literature is truly enormous (for
review see Ahuja et al., 2008). Despite the great volume of existing
empirical work, scholars have focused on a few themes:
uncovering predictors of ﬁrms’ innovation efforts and outputs
(Ahuja et al., 2008), antecedents and inhibitors of successful
innovation (Benner & Tushman, 2003), diffusion of innovation
(Rogers, 1995; Teece, 1986), and, more recently, ﬁrm responses to
unsuccessful innovation (Eggers, 2012; Maslach, 2016). Very few
studies have looked directly at the effects of innovation on ﬁrm
performance (for a similar point see Carroll & Teo, 1996;
Damanpour & Evan, 1984; Khessina, 2003; Lahiri & Narayanan,
2013). It seems that scholars have assumed that if a ﬁrm succeeds
at innovation, it will inevitably reap performance beneﬁts.
Consequently, the dominant objective in the literature is to
understand what types of organizations in what environmental
conditions are likely to succeed at innovation, rather than to
establish the consequences of innovation (for a review see Ahuja
et al., 2008).
It is striking that, without relying on direct empirical evidence,
the vast majority of studies strongly imply that innovation
positively affects ﬁrm performance and survival. As Fig. 1 shows,
scholars usually admit that commercializing invention into
innovation can be risky (Ahuja et al., 2008; Kline & Rosenberg,
1986). Organizations often fail to transform invention intoPlease cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
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2005), but even when they do succeed, it may often carry
signiﬁcant costs (Tripsas, 1997; Eggers, 2012). In contrast, many
scholars imply that once invention is successfully commercialized
into innovation (i.e., put into production and shipped to market),
innovation itself is largely unproblematic for ﬁrm operation and
survival. Of course, scholars distinguish between innovations that
failed and succeeded commercially on the market. However, the
literature has focused on the causes, rather than consequences of
an innovation’s commercial failure and success (e.g., Teece, 1986;
Dougherty, 1992). More importantly, even fewer studies have
suggested that innovation that achieved commercial success on
the market might still incur signiﬁcant downstream costs (Carroll
& Teo, 1996; Khessina, 2003; McKendrick & Wade, 2010).
When researchers do attend to the linkage between innovation
and ﬁrm performance, they tend to look for evidence of beneﬁts
rather than costs, thus conﬁrming their assumption. For example,
scholars have theorized advantageous effects of innovation on ﬁrm
market share (Henderson & Clark, 1990), proﬁtability (Geroski,
Machin, & van Reenen, 1993), sales growth (Anderson & Tushman,
1990), revenues (Rothaermel, Hitt, & Jobe, 2006), patent citation
rates (Sørensen & Stuart, 2000), market leadership (Christensen &
Bower, 1996), ﬁrm renewal (Kaul, 2012), and efﬁciency (Dam-
anpour & Evan, 1984). The literature also proposed that innovation
may beneﬁt the performance of innovative ﬁrms indirectly by
triggering a process of “creative destruction”, whereby less
innovative ﬁrms are driven out of an industry by more successful
innovative competitors (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Eggers, 2012;
Schumpeter, 1934; Sosa, 2011; Tripsas, 1997). Accordingly,
empirical research has largely examined the questions of whether
and how innovation boosts ﬁrm performance and survival (e.g.,
Bayus, Erikson & Jacobson, 2003; Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995;
Henderson, 1993; Klepper & Simons, 2000a).
Despite the broad consensus that greater innovation leads to
higher organizational performance, the reliable empirical evidence
of this linkage remains minimal (Khessina, 2003; Lahiri &
Narayanan, 2013). We think the conclusion that innovation
necessarily enhances ﬁrm performance may be premature given
the theoretical and methodological challenges in the research that
purportedly supports this assumption.
Challenges of establishing innovation effects on ﬁrm performance
Deﬁnitional issues
Many scholars rely on one or more aspects of the original
deﬁnition of innovation provided by Schumpeter (1934), according
to whom, innovation may include the launch of a new product,
creation of new production and sales methods, discovery of new
sources of supply of raw materials and semi-ﬁnished goods,
opening of a new market, and creation of a new industry structure.
The literature disproportionally focuses on technological innova-
tion and deﬁnes it as a technical advance over old technology that
requires new knowledge or reconﬁguration of existing knowledge
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Depending on the extent of new
knowledge required, innovations are classiﬁed either as major (e.g.,
radical, competence-destroying, architectural, disruptive, etc.) or
as incremental (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Henderson &
Clark, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; for review see, Gatignon,
Tushman, Smith, & Anderson, 2002). Most empirical studies,
however, do not provide a conceptual deﬁnition of innovation and
deﬁne it only in empirical terms.
It is common to deﬁne innovation by ﬁrm success in the market.
For example, Kamien and Schwartz (1982) deﬁne innovation as
new products and processes that resulted in an improvement of a
ﬁrm’s market position. Roberts (1999) deﬁnes only those new
products as innovative that have high initial market share. Buter up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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share means that it is not surprising at all to ﬁnd that innovation is
beneﬁcial for organizational outcomes; such tautological deﬁni-
tions depend on the outcome itself.
Studies that avoid tautological deﬁnitions often have a different
issue  they deﬁne innovation too broadly. Deﬁnitions of
innovation, similar to “doing things differently in the realm of
economic life” (Schumpeter, 1939: 84) or “the adoption of an idea
or behavior that is new to the organization” (Hage, 1999: 599), are
common. For example, Damanpour and Gopalakrishnan (2001: 47)
deﬁne innovation “as the adoption of an idea or behaviour,
pertaining to a product, service, device, system, policy, or
programme, that is new to the adopting organization.” Unfortu-
nately, research that relies on such broad deﬁnitions often
confounds invention and innovation (Gatignon et al., 2002). It
leaves unclear whether innovation means just a prototype or a
fully commercialized product or process (see Fig. 1). Yet, as
Schumpeter (1939: 85) put it: “the making of the invention and the
carrying out of the corresponding innovation are, economically
and sociologically, two entirely different things.” It is important to
distinguish them both theoretically and empirically (Chandy,
Hopstaken, Narasimhan, & Prabhu, 2006; Kline & Rosenberg,
1986).
In our view, the most promising deﬁnitions of innovation avoid
the fallacies described above: (1) they are not tautological; and (2)
they are speciﬁc enough to avoid confounding invention and
innovation. For example, Edwards and Gordon (1984: 1) deﬁne
innovation as “a process that begins with an invention, proceeds
with the development of the invention, and results in the
introduction of a new product, process or service to the
marketplace.” In a similar vein, Katila and Shane (2005) deﬁne
innovation as a commercialized invention; Garud et al. (2013)
deﬁne innovation as the invention, development, and implemen-
tation of new ideas. These deﬁnitions treat innovation as more
than just the emergence of new ideas or inventions. Rather, such
ideas have to be developed and implemented into commercial
products or processes in order to be called innovation.
Empirical measurement concerns
Poor deﬁnitions of innovation often spillover to empirical
designs. Overly general deﬁnitions of innovation allow for the
construction of a great variety of empirical measures. Many of
these measures, however, have the same problems as the
deﬁnitions they are based on. Below we discuss strenghts and
weaknesses of popular innovation measures and summarize this
discussion in Table 2.
At the outset of empirical research on innovation, research
and development (R&D) expenditures were a popular measure
of innovation (e.g., Acs & Audretsch, 1988; Cohen & Klepper,
1996; Scherer, 1982; Soete, 1979). Yet, not all ﬁrms that manage
to innovate have R&D (Geroski et al., 1993). Furthermore, the
linkage between R&D investments (which measure innovation
inputs) and innovation outputs is tenuous at best (Erickson &
Jacobson, 1992; Hall, Griliches & Hausman, 1986). Over time, as
more direct measures of innovation have become available, the
popularity of R&D investments has declined (Becheikh, Landry,
& Amara, 2006).
Another common approach to measuring innovation is based
on the distinction between major (e.g., competence-destroying,
radical, architectural) and incremental innovations; with most
research focused on the effects of major innovations (e.g., Benner,
2010; Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Henderson & Clark, 1990;
Maslach, 2016; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Tripsas, 1997). Most
studies of major innovations provide very valuable insights and
rich analysis of their particular cases. However, cross-study
comparisons of the ﬁndings are difﬁcult, because the measuresPlease cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
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judgment of experts about speciﬁc contexts.
The search for more objective and generalizable measures has
led to the increasing popularity of patents (and patent citations) as
a measure of innovation (e.g., Acs & Audretsch, 1989; Carnabuci &
Operti, 2013; Joshi & Nerkar, 2011; Kim, 2016; Lee & Berente, 2012;
Sørensen & Stuart, 2000; Schilling, 2015; Whittington, Owen-
Smith & Powell, 2009). However, patents as a measure of
innovation, although instructive for many purposes, are also
problematic. First, patents confound invention and innovation.
Many patented inventions are never developed into commercial-
ized products and thus, never become an innovation. For example,
Chandy et al. (2006) revealed that of all 1573-drug related patents
that were in existence from 1980 to 1985, only 18.3% were
converted to actual launched drugs by the end of 2001. They also
found that ﬁrms that generated too many patents were less likely
to convert them into actual products. Thus, the assumed linkage
between patenting activity and innovation that made it to the
market is questionable.
Second, patents do not capture a wide range of process
innovations, deﬁned as creating new production processes or
delivery methods through changes in an operational process or
new equipment (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, & Winter, 1987).
Furthermore, patents do not capture important technological
activities that accumulate into commercial products, such as
imitation, intangible know-how, on-the-job training, production
engineering or learning-by-doing (McKendrick & Wade, 2010).
Discoveries in social and organizational arrangements are also
rarely patented (Rhoten & Powell, 2007).
Third, companies often prefer to protect their inventions
through secrecy rather than through the patent system (Cohen,
Nelson, & Walsh, 2000). Arundel and Kabla (1998) estimated that
companies only patent about 35.9% of their product innovations
and 24.8% of their process innovations.
Fourth, some ﬁrms practice defensive and offensive patenting.
They patent even minor inventions with low probability of
becoming an innovation in order to make it hard for competitors
to enter their market space and to protect themselves from the
analogous actions of competitors (Rice, 2015).
Lastly, a granted patent is an outcome of a complicated social
process that involves inventors, assignees, lawyers, and patent
examiners with their own individual biases and interests (Myers,
1995; Jensen, Kovacs, & Sorenson, 2018). As a result, successful
patenting reﬂects not only a company’s inventive capabilities, but
also its political and regulatory skills (Whittington et al., 2009).
Given the multiple issues with innovation measures based on
patents, some researchers have proposed measures based on
product-level data (Katila & Shane, 2005; Khessina, 2003;
McKendrick & Wade, 2010). One approach relies on new product
development (e.g., Bayus et al., 2003; Benner, 2010; Fosfuri &
Giarratana, 2009; Katila, 2002; McCann & Bahl, 2017; Wu, 2013).
The introduction of new products captures the potential commer-
cial importance of a company's innovative activities more directly
than patents do, because most innovative activities can signiﬁ-
cantly affect ﬁrm performance only when inventions are commer-
cially developed and introduced to the market (Katila, 2002). In
empirical studies, scholars using this approach deﬁne a new
product as one that shows a change in design characteristics
(Bayus et al., 2003; Martin & Mitchell, 1998). However, while such
innovations are new to the ﬁrm, they are not necessarily new to the
market (Leiponen & Helfat, 2010).
An alternative approach treats a product as innovative only
when it is new both to the ﬁrm and to the market. It measures
innovation by taking into account only new products introduced
at the industry frontier or its close proximity (e.g., Khessina &
Carroll, 2008; McKendrick & Wade, 2010; Roy & Sarkar, 2016).er up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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Table 2
Strengths and weaknesses of popular innovation measures.
Type of
innovation
measure
Examples of studies Measurement strategy Strenghts of the measure Weaknesses of the measure
R&D
expenditures
Acs and Audretsch (1988),Cohen
and Klepper (1996), Kaul (2012),
Scherer (1982) and Soete (1979)
 Total ﬁnancial expenditures on
research and development
 Data available for many large
public companies
 Not all innovative ﬁrms have R&D
 R&D expenditures measure inputs
to the innovation process
 The linkage between R&D
expenditures and innovation
outputs is tenuous
Major
innovations
Benner (2010), Christensen and
Rosenbloom (1995), Carroll and Teo
(1996), Henderson and Clark (1990),
Leiponen and Helfat (2011), Maslach
(2016), Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu
(2003), Tripsas (1997) and Tushman
and Anderson (1986)
 Identiﬁed by an expert  Rich description and analysis  Relies on subjective ex-post
judgements of experts
 Ignores incremental innovations
 Hard to compare across studies
Patents Acs and Audretsch (1989), Carnabuci
and Operti (2013), Joshi and Nerkar
(2011), Kehoe and Tzabbar (2015),
Kim (2016), Kim et al. (2016), Lahiri
and Narayanan (2013), Lee and
Berente (2012), Samila and
Sorenson (2010), Schilling (2015),
Sørensen and Stuart (2000), Stuart
(2000) and Whittington et al. (2009)
 Number of patents
 Number of patent citations
 Data is publically available for all
companies in any market
 Confounds invention and
innovation
 The linkage between patenting
activity and innovation that made it
to the market is questionable
 Does not capture a wide range of
process innovations
 Does not capture imitation,
intangible know-how, production
engineering or learning-by-doing
 Not all inventions and innovations
are patented. Some companies
prefer to use secrecy instead of the
patent system to protect their
inventions
 Some ﬁrms practice defensive and
offensive patenting
 Patenting reﬂects not only a
company’s inventive capabilities,
but also its political and regulatory
skills
Newproduct
development
Bayus et al. (2003), Benner (2010),
Fosfuri and Giarratana (2009), Katila
(2002), Katila and Ahuja (2002),
Leiponen and Helfat (2010), Martin
and Mitchell (1998), Maslach (2016),
McCann and Bahl (2017), Un (2011),
and Wu (2013)
 New products that show a
change in design characteristics
 Captures the potential commer-
cial importance of a company's
innovative activities
 Such products are new to their
ﬁrms, but not necessarily new to the
market
 Does not capture process
innovation
Newproducts
at the
industry
frontier
Dodson (1985), Karim (2009), Katila
and Chen (2008), Keeney and Lilien
(1987), Khessina (2003), Khessina
and Carroll (2008), McKendrick et al.
(2009), McKendrick and Wade
(2010), Roy and Sarkar (2016), Sahal
(1985) and Turner et al. (2010)
 New products introduced at the
industry frontier or its close
proximity
 New products that improve
relative to other products in their
ﬁrm and cross a threshold into a new
technological regime
 New products that result in a ﬁrm’s
entry into a new product market
 Effectively differentiates between
innovation and invention
 Allows cross-study comparisons
 Does not capture process inno-
vation
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improvement in design and technology characteristics impor-
tant to users (Katila & Chen, 2008; Sahal, 1985). This measure
often deﬁnes industry frontier by the best technical perfor-
mance existing at a particular time and accounts for the distance
of any new product from this frontier (Khessina 2003;
McKendrick, Wade & Jaffee, 2009). Slightly different approaches
measure new products as innovative only if they offer both
improvement relative to other products in their ﬁrm and cross a
threshold into a new technological regime (Turner, Mitchell &
Bettis, 2010) or if they result in a ﬁrm’s entry into a new product
market (Karim, 2009).
Innovation measures based on the introduction of new
technologically advanced products effectively differentiatePlease cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
creativity and innovation, Research in Organizational Behavior (2018), hbetween innovation and invention, are available for all ﬁrms in
many industries and are somewhat easy to compare across studies.
One weakness of these measures, however, is that while they
measure product innovation well, they only indirectly measure
process innovation, such as innovation in production processes or
delivery methods.
Overall, while all existing measures of innovation offer unique
advantages, they also have disadvantages, which are more
extensive for some measures (e.g., R&D expenditures, patents)
than for others (e.g., introduction of new advanced products).
Reliance on different measures makes it difﬁcult to interpret and
compare empirical ﬁndings and can be another reason why
scholars overlook the costs of innovation. For example, if a measure
relies on patent counts, the probability of uncovering negativeer up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.riob.2018.11.003
1 Product innovation is deﬁned as new products or services developed and
introduced to market to meet the needs of external users (Damanpour &
Gopalakrishnan, 2001; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Process innovation is deﬁned as
developing and implementing a new or signiﬁcantly improved production process
or delivery method through changes in the operational process or new equipment
(Utterback & Abernathy, 1975; Wong, Lee, & Foo, 2008).
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than if a measure relies on counts of new products introduced at
the frontier. This happens because the process of generating and
patenting inventions is much less disruptive for a ﬁrm’s operation
than the process of commercializing these inventions.
Sample selection issues
The third common methodological problem in the empirical
literature on innovation is sample selection bias. This bias happens
when a researcher uses a non-random sampling principle to
sample the underling population for statistical analysis and,
consequently, ends up with a distorted representation of the true
population (Heckman, 1990). Many studies reporting purported
beneﬁts of innovation, analyzed non-randomly selected groups of
ﬁrms: market leaders, large ﬁrms, or public companies. Some even
sampled on the dependent variable by studying only surviving
ﬁrms, most of which are inherently successful.
Examplesof studieswith sample selectionproblemsare plentiful.
For instance, in a study of the photolithographic alignment
equipment industry, Henderson and Clark (1990) relied on ex-post
expert judgements to determine architectural innovations, deﬁned
as new products with the same components, but changed
architecture. In their study of the worldwide hard disk drive
industry, Christensen and Bower (1996) used ex-post expert
judgements to measure disruptive innovation, deﬁned as a new
class of products within an old industry that disrupted the
incumbent order. These two studies showed positive effects of
innovation on ﬁrm market share and leadership. However, because
theyanalyzed only industry leaders, their ﬁndings do not generalize
to small, medium-sized, or even large non-leader ﬁrms. Sørensen
and Stuart (2000) used U.S. patents to measure ﬁrm innovation in
the semiconductor industry. Geroski et al. (1993) relied on ex-post
expert judgements to measure ﬁrm innovation as the number of
technologically important and commercially signiﬁcant innova-
tions in the U.K. manufacturing sector. Both studies analyzed
innovation impact only on large and public companies, and thus left
open the question of whether innovations in these respective
markets affect the performance of small and private ﬁrms.
Those empirical studies that avoid the sample selection issue by
covering all ﬁrms participating in a given industry over a long (or
entire) period of industry development are not conclusive about
the impact of innovation on ﬁrm performance. On the one hand,
some studies revealed a positive effect of innovation. For example,
Banbury and Mitchell (1995) relied on ex-post expert judgement to
identify important incremental product innovations, deﬁned as
reﬁnements and extensions of established designs that result in
substantial price or functional beneﬁts to users. They found that in
the U.S. cardiac pacemaker industry, more innovative ﬁrms had
higher market shares and greater survival rates. Klepper and
Simons (2000b) focused on major innovations identiﬁed as such
ex-post by experts as well, and found that in the U.S. tire industry
innovative ﬁrms survived longer.
On the other hand, other studies failed to ﬁnd an unambigu-
ously beneﬁcial effect of innovation on ﬁrm performance. For
example, Carroll and Teo (1996) relied on ex-post expert judgments
to deﬁne an innovation event as the earliest signiﬁcant commercial
introduction of a new product or process in the U.S. automobile
industry. They found that ﬁrms that introduced a greater number
of innovations survived longer, but the larger the company was, the
less beneﬁcial was innovation for its survival. In a study of the U.S.
semiconductor industry, Barnett and Freeman (2001) deﬁned
innovative products as the ﬁrst time that a given product category
ever appeared in the industry. They found that while ﬁrms with
more innovative products on the market survived longer, ﬁrms that
introduced many innovative products simultaneously had higher
failure rates. Khessina (2006) found that in the worldwide opticalPlease cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
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deﬁned as products with performance at the industry’s techno-
logical frontier, survived longer, this beneﬁt diminished for ﬁrms
with too many innovative products.
To summarize, empirical studies conducted on all ﬁrms in a
given industry over whole or long periods of industry development
demonstrate that the relationship between innovation and ﬁrm
performance is more complex than it ﬁrst appears. Innovation may
not only fail to enhance ﬁrm performance, but under certain
conditions it can be outright harmful.
Sources of negative innovation effects
Although the positive consequences of innovation are allegedly
well established, inconsistent empirical ﬁndings suggest that
innovation may have a range of positive and negative effects. Since
the literature takes for granted the existence of positive effects of
innovation and has reviewed them elsewhere, we focus on a
systematic review of the negative effects and the underlying
mechanisms that drive these effects.
Following previous research, we deﬁne innovation as “a process
that begins with an invention, proceeds with the development of
the invention, and results in the introduction of a new product,
process or service to the marketplace” (Edwards & Gordon,1984: 1;
Garud et al., 2013; Katila & Shane, 2005). To simplify our arguments
we focus on product innovation (by which we mean both product
and service innovations), because it has the greatest variety of
consequences, but most of our theorizing applies to both product
and process innovation.1
In parallel with the section on creativity, we look at the three
negative consequences of innovation: (1) inherent costs of
innovation, (2) side effects of innovation, and (3) long-term
consequences of innovation. Table 1 provides an analytical map of
these factors.
Inherent costs of innovation
Product innovation is a type of organizational change, and as
with any other organizational change, it has inherent costs. To
uncover these costs, we adapt a model developed by organizational
ecologists for understanding the consequences of organizational
change. According to this model, organizational change has two
dimensions: content of change and process of change (Carroll &
Hannan, 2000). Content of change refers to what is different in an
organization before and after transformation. Process of change
refers to the way the change in the content occurs: decisions made,
sequences of speciﬁc actions undertaken, resistance encountered,
speed of transformation, and so on. Process of change may
generate signiﬁcant costs even when content of change is
beneﬁcial. We apply this two-dimensional model to uncover the
inherent costs of product innovation to its organization.
Product innovation comes to its logical completion when a ﬁrm
brings to the market a new product with parameters at the
industry frontier. We call it an innovation outcome. It is a similar
construct to content of change. When successful, innovation
outcomes often bring beneﬁts to their ﬁrms. However, in order to
produce innovation outcomes ﬁrms have to engage in a process of
innovation development; that is, a process of creating products wither up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.riob.2018.11.003
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creative idea, developing it into an invention, and then ﬁnally
commercializing it into an innovation in a form of a new product
shipped to the market. Garud et al. (2013: 776) describes this
development process “as the sequence of events that unfold as
ideas emerge, are developed, and are implemented within ﬁrms,
across multi-party networks, and within communities.”
The process of innovation development is a similar construct to
process of change. It can incur signiﬁcant costs, even if the
resulting innovation outcomes are beneﬁcial. Speciﬁcally, the
development of innovation may create disruptions in a ﬁrm’s
internal routines and structures and relationships with environ-
mental actors, and in this way reduce or even eliminate potential
beneﬁts from innovation outcomes (Carroll & Teo, 1996; McKen-
drick & Wade, 2010). A complete assessment of the effects of
innovation on organizational performance and survival requires
considering both aspects of innovation: innovation outcomes and
the development process that led to these innovation outcomes
(Carroll & Teo, 1996; Khessina, 2003).
Outcomes of product innovation: beneﬁts and costs
A ﬁrm that succeeds at generating innovation outcomes may
experience both positive and negative consequences. Because the
literature has already thoroughly discussed the beneﬁts of
innovation outcomes, we will mention them only brieﬂy. Instead,
we will focus on three different ways that innovation outcomes can
cause harm: (a) incorrect forecasting of market demand; (b)
unsuccessful appropriability; and (c) complicated relationships
with audiences.
Costs of an incorrect forecast of consumer preferences and market
demand
Not every ﬁrm that succeeds at shipping its innovative product
to market manages to derive beneﬁts from this innovation. If a new
product offers features that customers do not either understand or
appreciate, it will not manage to attract customer attention. This
happens when a ﬁrm inaccurately predicts consumer preferences
and market demand, developing a product that customers either
do not want at all or are not ready for yet.
The severity of inaccurate forecast of demand by innovating
producers depends on the stage of technology evolution (Klepper,
1997). The basic evolutionary model of technological change
suggests that a cycle typically starts with a technological
discontinuity, deﬁned as an order-of-magnitude improvement in
the maximum achievable price vs. performance frontier of an
industry (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Technological discontinuity
either gives rise to a new market or transforms the existing market
by unleashing an era of ferment characterized by a high level of
technical variation and uncertainty. Over time, the processes of
selection and convergence among competing technologies likely
lead to the emergence of a dominant design, which starts a period
of incremental change, until another technological discontinuity
comes to life and starts the cycle anew (Anderson & Tushman,
1990).
The evolutionary model of technological change suggests that
the accurate prediction of customer demand is most challenging in
nascent markets during the era of ferment when neither the nature
of new technology nor its trajectory is obvious ex ante (Anderson &
Tushman, 1990). Nascent markets are particularly challenging for
three major reasons that we discuss below.
Nascent markets: cost of betting on a losing technology
The simultaneous proliferation of competing technologies is
common in nascent markets (Eggers, 2012; Wade, 1995). FirmsPlease cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
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sunk investment in tangible resources and capability development.
Unfortunately, it is hard to forecast which technology will win.
Firms that bet on a technology that is eventually selected out and
abandoned, will bear the costs of imprinting on a failing
technological path (Arthur, 1989; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Even
when it becomes clear which technology is winning, most ﬁrms
that bet on a losing technology will either continue making
innovative products based on it, or will try to (mostly)
unsuccessfully switch to the winning technology (Eggers, 2012).
Customers will ignore products made by companies that recently
switched in favor of products made by organizations with well-
developed capabilities in the winning technology (Wade, 1995).
Incorrectly forecasting the winning technology makes it hard (if
not impossible) for a ﬁrm to derive beneﬁts from its innovation in
both the short and long-term. For example, in the early stages of
the ﬂat panel industry, among many competing options two
technologies attracted a lot of producer attention and support:
plasma displays and liquid crystal displays (LCD). Still, it was
uncertain which technology would eventually win. Eggers (2012)
shows that a great majority of ﬁrms that bet on plasma displays
were unable to successfully switch to LCDs when it became clear
that LCD technology was winning.
Nascent markets: cost of relying on divergent technological frames
A ﬁrm may fail to forecast demand for its innovative products
correctly when the company and its potential customers rely on
different “technological frames”, deﬁned as cognitive tools that
actors use to make sense of technologies (Orlikowski & Gash,
1994). Technological frames shape actors’ decisions and choices
(Davidson, 2006; Leonardi, 2011). They affect whether producers
invest in a speciﬁc technology, how they develop and commer-
cialize this technology, as well as whether users choose this
technology over competing options and adopt it (Kaplan & Tripsas,
2008).
When a ﬁrm and its potential customers rely on divergent
technological frames, they interpret technology and its usefulness
differently. Under these conditions, the ﬁrm may release a product
innovation believing it will address consumer demands, but
consumers will fail to see that and ignore the ﬁrm’s new product.
One reason this might happen is the inertia of incumbent ﬁrms,
which tend to impose on new technology old technological frames
developed under technological regimes of previous industry
afﬁliations (Benner & Tripsas, 2012). As a result, their approach
to new products is often more outdated than what customers
expect. For example, in the nascent personal digital assistant (PDA)
industry, many ﬁrst entrants developed products that were similar
in design and functionality to their previous products: Hewlett
Packard made its PDAs look like sophisticated calculators, NEC
made its PDAs look like word processors and so on (Kaplan &
Tripsas, 2008). However, users found devices that combined the
functionalities of PDAs and mobile phones more appealing and
quickly switched to smartphones.
Nascent markets: cost of innovating in a categorization vacuum
The risk of incorrectly forecasting customer demand for
innovative products increases in nascent markets that lack a well-
deﬁned categorization order. Market categorization is a process by
which audiences, such as investors, suppliers, employees, security
analysts, and consumers, sort organizations and their products into
categorical groups with labels based on organizational and product
similarities (e.g., biotechnology ﬁrms, nanotechnology devices, etc.).
Over time, market categories may become institutionalized and
acquire a taken-for-grantedstatus asthe result of consistent usage by
audiences (Hannan, Pólos, & Carroll, 2007). Institutionalized market
categories are vital because they provide meaning systems, shapeer up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.riob.2018.11.003
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conformity and sanctions for nonconformity in industries (Hannan
et al., 2007; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Zuckerman,1999). Categories
allow actors to make sense of products, producers and their
audiences more easily (Khessina & Reis, 2016; Porac, Thomas,
Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1995).
Nascent markets, however, do not have established categoriza-
tion orders and require time to become cognitively coherent (Rosa,
Porac, Runser-Spanjol, & Saxon, 1999; Suarez, Grodal, & Gotso-
poulos, 2015). Producers and their audiences need to continuously
interact and negotiate meanings in the process of public discourse
to develop new classiﬁcation systems (Kahl & Grodal, 2016;
Kennedy, 2008; Koçak, Hannan, & Hsu, 2014;). Before new
categories emerge and are agreed upon, ﬁrms selling innovative
offerings face considerable risks. Customers tend to ignore
innovations that they fail to categorize, as they are likely to
perceive them as incomprehensible and strange and, thus, not
useful (Rindova & Petkova, 2007). For example, Sony initially failed
to generate decent sales in the USA for its ﬁrst entertainment robot
for the home: a pet dog, AIBO. General manager, T. Yazawa, argued
that Sony “could sell more AIBOs in the United States if more
people understood what we are selling.” (Moon, 2003: 10; Rindova
& Petkova, 2007).
The emergence of categories is rarely a smooth process.
Suarez et al. (2015) suggest that nascent industries start with a
phase of categorical divergence, when a great number of
categories come into existence, but remain fuzzy and cause
confusion. For example, in the early days of the automobile
industry, audiences referred to automobiles as “the velocipede,
motorcycle, locomobile, electric runabout, electric buggy,
horseless carriage, automobile, and quadricycle” (Rao, 2008:
19). Such a great variety of emerging, but fuzzy categories
related to an automobile, reﬂected not only the differences in
technology and strategic positioning of producers, but also
pointed to the confusion and diversity of audiences’ under-
standings of what this new product was about. The great
diversity and fuzziness of emerging categories made it difﬁcult
for ﬁrms to understand what customers actually wanted.
Additionally, it made it hard for producers to predict which
category would eventually become dominant (Suarez et al.,
2015).
If the industry persists, the phase of categorical divergence is
followed by the phase of categorical convergence and the
development of a categorization order (Rosa et al., 1999; Suarez
et al. 2015). An established categorization order makes it easier for
innovating ﬁrms to ﬁnd a common language with customers, but
until this happens the forecasting of demand remains an uncertain
activity and innovation based on incorrectly predicted demand
remains a high risk endeavor.
Mature markets: cost of consumer post-purchase regret
Firms may miscalculate demand for their innovations not only
in emerging markets in the era of ferment, but also in mature
markets in the period of incremental change. In this period,
innovation efforts of companies shift either to process innovation
or to improving performance and features of existing offerings
(Klepper, 1996). Firms try to forecast which new features and
performance advances in existing products customers will
appreciate enough to pay for. The problem, however, is that
customers may be uncertain about what they want (Jiang,
Narasimhan, & Turut, 2017). For example, a customer may know
that features of a new smartphone improved (e.g., the resolution of
the phone’s display became higher), but remain uncertain about
how much she will beneﬁt from these new higher-quality features.
This uncertainty may prevent the consumer from making a
purchase. Additionally, when thinking about a purchase manyPlease cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
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the purchase altogether (Jiang et al., 2017). Thus, even in mature
markets, forecast of demand could be challenging and ﬁrms may
create, produce and ship to market innovative products that
customers are not willing to buy.
To summarize, a ﬁrm may fail to accurately forecast customer
demand in both nascent and mature markets. Such a ﬁrm will fail
to generate anticipated sales and will not manage to recoup its
expenses from the development of innovation. Its overall perfor-
mance will suffer and the risk of failure will go up.
Costs of unsuccessful appropriability
A ﬁrm may accurately predict market demand, create and ship an
innovative product that appeals to customers, but still fail to beneﬁt
from it, if rivals manage to imitate this innovation with lesser
investments and, therefore, increase competition for the original
innovator (Encaoua, Guellec, & Martinez, 2006). This situation
describes an appropriability problem. Appropriability refers to a
ﬁrm’s ability to capture economic returns to its investment in
innovation (Teece, 1986). Low appropriability is one of the key
reasonswhy ﬁrms mayfail tobeneﬁt fromtheir innovation outcomes
even when important audiences ﬁnd them of high value.
Firms appropriate returns from their innovations in two major
ways: Through formal legal mechanisms, such as intellectual
property (IP) rights, and through mechanisms that prevent
competitors from seizing their knowledge through spillovers
(Knott & Posen, 2009). Knowledge spillovers happen when an
organization’s investments in knowledge creation produce exter-
nal beneﬁts by facilitating innovation by other ﬁrms (Jaffe,
Trajtenberg, & Fogarty, 2000), either unintentionally, when other
ﬁrms imitate the organization’s invention, or intentionally, when
the organization’s scientists disclose their research (Breschi &
Lisson, 2001).
Patenting prevents direct imitation in industries with strong IP
protection (for review, Somaya, 2012). Complementary assets
(deﬁned as assets helpful for commercialization of innovation,
such as, marketing, competitive manufacturing, distribution
system, after-sales support and so on), secrecy, and efforts to
locate away from the market space of competitors are key
mechanisms to prevent knowledge spillovers, especially in
markets with weak IP regimes (for review, James, Leiblein, & Lu,
2013). All of these mechanisms are costly to develop and maintain,
and none of them are foolproof.
Patent protection is costly to create and enforce. Costs include
patent ﬁling fees, follow-on patent issuance, patent maintenance
fees, costs of identifying infringement and legal costs to defend
rights to exclusivity (James et al., 2013). In exchange for incurring
these costs, patent law gives the owner or licensee of the patented
invention a legal right to prevent others from using it.
Unfortunately, in many industrial contexts, the actual protection
afforded by patent law is often much weaker than intended. This
happens because a patent offers an exclusionary right instead of
an afﬁrmative right, i.e., it does not allow a patent’s owner to
exploit the invention if such use infringes on the rights of others,
as is the case with patents based on prior inventions that are still
covered by someone else's patents (Ziedonis, 2004). It may also be
impossible to effectively enforce exclusionary protection (James
et al., 2013). As a result, there is no guarantee that a patent holder
will capture the expected proﬁts from its invention (Cohen et al.,
2000).
When a patent protection regime is weak, ﬁrms may rely on
secrecy as a value capture mechanism (Cohen et al., 2000). Secrecy
refers to procedures that restrict the ﬂow of information within
and outside of a ﬁrm (James et al., 2013). The efﬁcacy of secrecy
varies with the complexity of the technology underlying aner up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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can be reverse-engineered, but more effective at protecting more
complex, hard to imitate innovations (Rivkin, 2000). Even when
effective, secrecy has costs. It is costly to create and maintain
organizational structures that control the ﬂow of information and
monitor employee behavior (Liebeskind, 1997). Additionally,
because such structures restrict the ﬂow of innovation they
inhibit future innovation (James et al., 2013).
Complementary assets are instrumental to commercializing
any innovation and become extremely important when both
patent and secrecy protections fail. Complementary assets can be
generic (commodity-type assets that can be transacted for in the
open market) or specialized (unique assets that are critical to the
commercialization of an innovation) (Kapoor & Furr, 2015;
Rothaermel & Hill, 2005; Teece, 1986). The latter are more effective
at appropriating returns to innovation (Cohen et al., 2000; Teece,
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Having marketing, distribution and other
systems customized to a speciﬁc innovation, allows a ﬁrm to
produce, promote, and sell an innovative product much cheaper
and faster than competitors can, even if they imitate the
innovation. However, because specialized complementary assets
are costly to develop, ﬁrms may not possess them and, as a result,
fail to capture value from their innovation.
In short, ﬁrms operating in industries or countries with a weak
IP regime and ﬁrms lacking complementary assets are at high risk
of imitation and may be unable not only to generate proﬁts from
their innovation, but also fail to recoup their investment expenses
(James et al., 2013; Teece 1986).
Beneﬁts and costs of complicated relationships with audiences
If the ﬁrm accurately forecasts demand for its new product and
has capabilities to appropriate returns from its innovation, it may
greatly appeal to several important resource-holding audiences,
such as consumers, suppliers, investors, employees, alliance
partners, other ﬁrms, and governmental agencies. For example,
if a new product embodies features that address changing
customer preferences, the ﬁrm will increase both its product
and organizational appeal to consumers and, as a result, will elicit
higher sales (Gunday, Ulusoy, Kilic, & Alpkan, 2011; Sorenson,
2000). Such a ﬁrm also possesses an advantage in attracting
talented employees (Almeida & Kogut, 1999), makes a more
desirable partner for joint ventures and R&D alliances (Mowery,
Oxley & Silverman, 1998; Sampson, 2007), acquires greater
attention and resources from potential partners in the value chain
of the production process (Podolny, Stuart & Hannan, 1996), and
successfully mobilizes funds from investors (Bygrave & Timmons,
1992; Sorenson, Assenova, Li, Boada, & Fleming, 2016).
Thus, ﬁrms with successful innovation outcomes are likely to
perform better with a variety of important audiences than less
innovative ﬁrms (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Stuart, 2000).
However, the overall effect of a ﬁrm’s increased appeal to
audiences is not always straightforward and can become
double-edged in the long run. For example, although ﬁrms with
successful innovation outcomes are sought out by other companies
for R&D alliances, they may fail to derive an innovation advantage
from such joint ventures if other participants possess lower
innovative capabilities (Doz, 1988). They may also become a victim
of misappropriation if alliance partners have better capabilities for
appropriating innovation (Katila, Rosenberg & Eisenhardt, 2008).
Finally, a ﬁrm may waste its resources on an alliance without
obtaining any substantial beneﬁts if the alliance fails to generate an
effective system of knowledge exchange (for a review see Wang &
Rajagopalan, 2015).
While innovative companies manage to attract many talented
and creative employees, they often fail to keep them. They arePlease cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
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and employee-started ventures (Ganco, Ziedonis, & Agarwal, 2015).
By hiring a ﬁrm’s talented employees, competitors not only put a
dent into the ﬁrm’s stock of human capital, but also learn the ﬁrm’s
technological know-how from the poached hires (Rosenkopf &
Almeida, 2003). As a result, the ﬁrm may lose its innovative
advantage to competitors (Singh & Agarwal, 2011). Additionally,
talented knowledge workers may leave these companies to start
their own technological ventures, known as spin-offs and spin-outs
(Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, & Sarkar, 2004; Brittain & Freeman,
1986; Wong et al., 2008). These former employees tend to transfer
the knowledge they acquired at parent companies to their own
ventures, dilutingtheparent’s innovativeadvantage(Franco& Filson,
2006; Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). Thus, while ﬁrms with successful
innovation outcomes appeal to important audiences, the resulting
interactions with audiences may bring both beneﬁts and signiﬁcant
costs, generating short- and long-term tradeoffs.
To summarize, although successful outcomes of product
innovation have great potential to generate sales and bring other
performance advantages to the innovative ﬁrms, they have
inherent costs that in certain circumstances can be quite high.
First, ﬁrms may successfully ship their product innovation to
market only to discover that they incorrectly predicted customer
demand. Second, innovative ﬁrms may fail to appropriate returns
from their innovation if they operate in a low appropriability
regime and do not have complementary assets to compensate for
the lack of IP protection. Finally, although ﬁrms with successful
innovation outcomes attract many audiences, these audiences
could take advantage of these ﬁrms in the long run.
Development process of product innovation: the risk of unintended
consequences
To beneﬁt from innovation outcomes a ﬁrm needs to produce
innovation that addresses market demands and to possess IP
protection or complementary assets to appropriate returns from
this innovation. Yet, even then, the ﬁrm may still bear the costs of
unintended negative consequences because of a second aspect of
product innovation. In order to cultivate innovation outcomes, the
ﬁrm has to engage in the process of innovation development, and
that process tends to be hazardous.
For example, Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner project announced in 2003
and commercialized in 2011 was a highly successful product
innovation if we treat it only as an innovation outcome. The
Dreamliner aircraft was revolutionary in technology and design
(Shenhar, Holzmann, Melamed, & Zhao, 2016). It has generated high
demand in the market. Moreover, Boeing has wardedoff competition
fromitskeycompetitor, Airbus, and appropriatedthereturns fromits
innovation (Wren, 2017). Yet, if we look at the Dreamliner project
from the standpoint of innovation development, we will see that the
process of developingthis innovationgenerated massive unintended
consequences. The Dreamliner program was supposed to cost $6
billion and launch the ﬁrst plane in 2008. However, numerous
extensivedelays,serviceproblemsandcostsoverruns resultedin$33
billion of escalated costs and delayed the delivery of the ﬁrst aircraft
by 40 months (Shenhar et al., 2016). Some analysts believe that,
because of colossal unanticipated costs, Boeing will not be able to
proﬁt from the Dreamliner project (Gates, 2015). Thus, while Boeing
experienced a tremendous success with its innovation outcome, the
costs of developing this innovation outcome turned out to be
enormously high and harmed both the short and long-term
performance of the company.
A formalized theory of architectural change (Hannan, Pólos &
Carroll, 2003, 2007) helps to explain why the development of
innovation, as a type of structural change, may harm ﬁrm
performance and survival. It suggests that structural change iner up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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architectural unit in a ﬁrm creates a structural violation in units
subordinated to it.2 As a result, the initial change triggers adjusting
changes in other units to remove the violation. The units that
undertake adjusting changes subsequently trigger changes in
subordinate units, and so on. Consequently, a local structural
change in the organization may initiate a cascade of other
structural changes, especially if an organizational architecture is
complex and interdependent.
Cascading changes prolong the time required for reorgani-
zation, drain ﬁrm resources, and distract managerial attention.
During such reorganization periods, managers are forced to
focus on solving the restructuring problems and, as a result,
miss many revenue-generating opportunities. Firm perfor-
mance suffers and its mortality hazard goes up. For example,
in 1999, previously well performing, Xerox Corporation found
itself on the brink of dying after it simultaneously reorganized
its sales and billing functions. These two changes generated so
many structural issues and behavioral mistakes that the ﬁrm’s
management spent the next 18 months focused on ﬁxing
internal problems and lost its grasp on customer relations and
competition (Hannan et al., 2003).
We think the development of innovation, as a type of structural
change, may have cascading consequences. The development of
innovation typically involves changes in ﬁrm internal structures
(e.g., retraining employees, creating research teams, relocating
resources, changing the reward structure) and relationships with
external actors (e.g., choosing different suppliers, hiring employees
with novel skills, creating new R&D alliances, shifting to new
customers). Moreover, innovation requires the coordinated effort
of many actors across different parts of an organization and even
across organizational boundaries (Dougherty, 1992; Garud et al.,
2013; Tatikonda & Montoya-Weiss, 2001). Many of these trans-
formations in organizational architecture, both formal and
informal, generate cascading changes and end up costing an
organization far more than was initially expected (Carroll & Teo,
1996; Gaimon, Özkan, & Napoleon, 2011).
Structural strains from cascading changes caused by innovation
development not only distract managerial attention from external
opportunities, but also create a signiﬁcant emotional and
psychological burden on employees (Dahl, 2011). For example,
uncertainty of innovation development gives rise to fear, stress,
and similar negative emotions among top and middle managers
(Vuori & Huy, 2016). Thus, the overall effectiveness and produc-
tivity of employees can signiﬁcantly decrease. As a result, the ﬁrm
experiences not only disruptions from innovation development,
but also the lack of ability to effectively deal with them.
There are several conditions under which innovation develop-
ment is likely to generate unintended cascading changes and be
disruptive. In the next section, we focus on three sources of such
conditions and associated costs: (a) the frequency with which a
ﬁrm undertakes the development of innovation; (b) the number of
innovations that a ﬁrm develops simultaneously; and (c) a ﬁrm’s
structural characteristics.
Costs of frequent development of product innovations
The development of innovation requires structural changes.
Some may be small, others quite substantial. Even when the
development of innovation entails small structural changes, they
may still have negative consequences if a ﬁrm frequently initiates2 Subordination/superordination refers to speciﬁed lines of authority, the ﬂow of
work, or any similar relation that allow one part of the organization to impose
constraints on another part (Hannan et al., 2007).
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drick & Wade, 2010).3 Such a ﬁrm may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to maintain a
smooth transition from one product innovation to the next
(Gaimon et al., 2011; Garud et al., 2013). Repetitive rounds of
innovation development cumulatively amplify the burden on
organizational operations through ongoing cascading changes in
an organization’s structure. For example, in the semiconductor
industry, frequent innovation requires ﬁrms to initiate and
simultaneously manage a large number of alliances, which creates
multiple and persistent structural challenges for ﬁrms and reduces
their overall performance (Lahiri & Narayanan, 2013).
Over time, cumulative structural changes generate increasingly
burdensome drains on ﬁrm resources. Distracted by operational
problems created by constant reorganization, the ﬁrm may miss
revenue-generating opportunities. Therefore, the greater the
number of diverse innovations a ﬁrm has undertaken in the past,
the higher the cumulative structural strain it currently experi-
ences, and the less beneﬁcial its current innovation will be for its
overall performance and long-term survival.4 For example, Lahiri
and Narayanan (2013) ﬁnd that in the semiconductor industry,
ﬁrms with a high patenting frequency and large R&D alliance
portfolios have signiﬁcantly lower net income. Khessina (2003)
shows that in the worldwide optical disk drive industry, ﬁrms that
introduce frequent product innovations have higher failure rates.
McKendrick and Wade (2010) reveal that in the worldwide ﬂoppy
disk drive industry, small ﬁrms that undertake product innovation
frequently are more likely to exit the market than small ﬁrms that
innovate less often.
Costs of simultaneous development of multiple product innovations
When an organization develops many product innovations
simultaneously, the resulting structural strains and disruptions can
be very substantial and hazardous (Hannan et al., 2003). Even
single innovation development requires adjustments in different
parts of the organization (Garud et al., 2013). When multiple
product innovations occur at once, structural adjustments very
quickly become complicated: a structural adjustment for one
innovation may interfere with adjustments for others and so on
(Dougherty & Hardy, 1996; Van de Ven, Polley, Garud, &
Venkataraman, 1999). As a result, cascading changes quickly
multiply, and harm ﬁrm performance and survival chances. For
example, in the U.S. semiconductor market, ﬁrms that release too
many innovative products in the same year, experience lower
survival rates (Barnett & Freeman, 2001). This effect is signiﬁcantly
larger for the introduction of related products. Barnett and
Freeman (2001) argue that the development of related innovations
requires coordination, which creates even larger structural strains
than the development of independent innovations. The rate of ﬁrm
failure spikes up when a ﬁrm introduces many new products, but
then decreases over time. In short, new product introductions to
market can become “too much of a good thing” if too many
products are released simultaneously.environment (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Dougherty & Hardy, 1996; Henderson &
Clark, 1990; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). For example, the
successful company 3M is known for routinization of innovation. McKendrick and
Wade (2010) suggests that the alternative approach likely holds for markets where
technological change is a key to survival, but will not necessarily work in other
conditions.
er up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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involves (even requires) many different simultaneous innovations.
For example, some researchers propose that one of the key reasons
Boeing’s Dreamliner project turned out to be so unexpectedly
expensive was the complicated nature of its innovation develop-
ment. The development of this innovative aircraft included so
many simultaneous innovations in materials, construction, assem-
bly and management that they created massive structural strains
in the company, hiking up the overall costs of the project (Shenhar
et al., 2016).
Costs of development of product innovations in structurally complex
organizations
The third condition under which the development of innovation
is likely to be disruptive is when it occurs in an intricate
organizational structure. An organizational structure is intricate
when it consists of units that are densely interconnected (Hannan
et al., 2007). It is useful to think about the intricacy of an
organizational design in terms of the centrality of organizational
units. A unit is central if it is connected to many units that, in turn, are
connected to each other and to other units as well (Bonacich, 1987).
Structuralchangeinacentral unitcausesagreat numberofstructural
adjustments in units connected to it, in the units connected to these
units, and so on. As a result, increasingly intricate architectural
design induces greater cascading changes in an organization
(Hannan et al., 2007; Zhou & Wan, 2017). For example, Boeing
complicated its already intricate architectural design by involving,
withinthe Dreamline project, aglobal network ofabout700 localand
foreign suppliersresponsibleformorethan70%of the aircraftdesign,
manufacturing and assembly. The resulting organizational architec-
ture was so complex and interconnected that any change in one part
of it created massive problems through the rest of the organization,
generating additional issues and slowing down the problem-solving
and response time (Shenhar et al., 2016).
Why do organizations undertake changes that result in costly
and dangerous structural adjustments? One answer is that
disastrous consequences are often unanticipated because of
limited foresight on the part of those initiating a change. Decision
makers are more likely to suffer from limited foresight in opaque
organizations – organizations in which information about some
units is unavailable to other units (Hannan et al., 2007). Opacity
arises when information between units ﬂows only in highly
aggregated forms (e.g., budget estimates), when organizational
units speak different languages (e.g., engineering and marketing
departments), when some units strategically withhold informa-
tion (e.g., ﬁnance department), and so on (Dougherty, 1992; Rogers
& Rogers, 1976; Stinchcombe, 1990). Opacity causes actors to
underestimate the length of reorganization and the cost of change
and, therefore, often unwittingly undertake disastrous changes
(Hannan, Pólos, & Carroll, 2004). For example, he organizational
architecture created for Boeing’s Dreamliner project was very
opaque, because it included developers and suppliers from
different countries with highly dissimilar culture and work ethics.
Top management failed to foresee many structural, cultural and
political issues because it did not completely understand how the
hired contractors operated (Shenhar et al., 2016).
This discussion implies that the development of innovation
creates more disruptions and carries greater costs in structurally
intricate and opaque organizations than in simple and transparent
ones. Both organizational intricacy and opacity typically vary with
ﬁrm size and age. Speciﬁcally, large organizations tend to have
more complex architectural designs and more opaque structures
than smaller ﬁrms (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Rogers & Rogers, 1976;
Zhou & Wan, 2017). Therefore, in large ﬁrms the development of
innovation will generally create greater structural disruptions, and,Please cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
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large organizations will reap fewer beneﬁts from their innovation
outcomes than smaller ﬁrms. Indeed, Carroll and Teo (1996) found
that in the U.S. automobile industry, larger ﬁrms derived
signiﬁcantly fewer survival beneﬁts from major innovations than
did smaller ﬁrms. Similarly, Khessina (2003) showed, that in the
worldwide optical disk drive industry, large ﬁrms beneﬁted
signiﬁcantly less from product innovation than did smaller ﬁrms.
Organizational age may also have a profound effect on
innovation development. As ﬁrms age, they acquire more complex
structures (Hannan, 1998). The number of dysfunctional routines
that preserve action-constraining features (e.g., political coalitions,
precedents and the like) also increases with ﬁrm age (Barron, West,
& Hannan, 1994; Levitt & March, 1988). Accordingly, empirical
research shows that older ﬁrms experience more disruptions from
change than younger ones (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993;
Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991). Therefore, older organizations
should experience greater disruptions from innovation develop-
ment, and as a result, experience smaller beneﬁts from innovation
outcomes than younger ﬁrms.
In sum, while innovation outcomes that successfully make it to
market often (but not always) bring beneﬁts to the ﬁrm, the
process of developing these innovation outcomes tends to be
disruptive and may reduce or even eliminate these beneﬁts. Firms
that undertake frequent and simultaneous innovations, as well as
ﬁrms with complex and opaque organizational structures, are
especially likely to suffer from the harmful effects of innovation
development.
Side effects of innovation
Even commercially successful product innovation with low
inherent costs may generate harmful side effects for its ﬁrm and
sometimes even for its audiences and society. Innovation may
become very costly if it: (a) cannibalizes the ﬁrm’s existing product
line; (b) intensiﬁes competition in the industry; and (c) brings
audiences harm.
Risk of cannibalization
Cannibalization is the process by which a new product diverts
the attention of customers and takes away sales from existing
products offered by the same ﬁrm (Copulsky, 1976; Heskett, 1976).
In the context of innovation, cannibalization happens when an
incumbent ﬁrm’s sales of a new innovative product directly and
signiﬁcantly reduce the company’s proﬁts from sales of products
based on the old technology (Henderson, 1993; Reinganum, 1983).
Cannibalization not only affects sales, but it may also reduce the
actual and potential value of a ﬁrm’s investments in organizational
resources and capabilities (Chandy & Tellis, 1998).
Eventhough cannibalizationreducesa ﬁrm’s proﬁts fromexisting
products, under certain conditions it can be advantageous.
Cannibalization is desirable when the choice is between losing
market share of the ﬁrm’s old products to its new productsand losing
market share of the ﬁrm’s old products to products of competitors
(Kerin, Harvey, & Rothe, 1978). Additionally, a ﬁrm’s willingness to
cannibalize its existingproducts mayleadtothedevelopmentof new
resources and capabilities that may enhance future innovation
(Danneels, 2002; Danneels & Sethi, 2011). Still, short-term effects of
cannibalization are often very costly to ﬁrms, whereas long-term
effects, though potentially beneﬁcial, are often uncertain.
Beneﬁts and costs of intensiﬁed competition
If innovative ﬁrms manage to navigate the development of
innovation with minimal inherent costs, they become strongerer up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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stumbled during the process of innovation development. This
competitive advantage can be observed both at the level of
innovative products and at the level of innovative ﬁrms. Innovative
products likely generate higher demand and greater sales than
non-advanced offerings (Bayus et al., 2003; Fosfuri & Giarratana,
2009) and, thus, increase the intensity of inter-ﬁrm competition for
customer attention (McKendrick & Wade, 2010). Consequently,
innovative products are more likely to harm the performance of
ﬁrms in the industry than non-innovative products. For example,
Carroll and Teo (1996) ﬁnd that in the American automobile
industry, a focal ﬁrm’s failure rate increased with the number of
major innovations introduced by competing ﬁrms.
Not only do innovative products increase competition, but ﬁrms
that offer these products do it as well. This happens because
innovative ﬁrms shift the frontier, making it hard for laggards to
catch up (Methe, Swaminathan, & Mitchell, 1996; Sosa, 2011). They
tend to generate higher sales and grow faster (Bayus et al., 2003).
They are likely to monopolize the attention of customers and
resource-holding agents (Fosfuri & Giarratana, 2009; Sørensen &
Stuart, 2000). For all these reasons, more innovative companies
generate stronger competitive pressures than less innovative
ﬁrms, negatively affecting the performance and survival prospects
of other ﬁrms.
It is important to note that these competitive advantages do not
come without a price. Innovative ﬁrms exert competitive pressures
on all ﬁrms in the industry, including other innovative ﬁrms
(Barnett & Hansen, 1996; Khessina, 2003). Moreover, competition
between innovative ﬁrms (e.g., technology races) can be of much
higher intensity and consequence than between innovative and
non-innovative ﬁrms (Lerner, 1997). According to the Red Queen
theory of competition (Barnett, 2008), ﬁrms exposed to direct
competition become stronger competitors in the process of
learning, which in turn intensiﬁes competition and triggers a
new wave of learning and improvement in ﬁrms, which in turn
intensiﬁes competition even more, and so on. Competition
between innovative ﬁrms often follows the Red Queen pattern
and puts pressure on ﬁrms to win or at least stay in technology
races (Barnett & McKendrick, 2004; Lerner, 1997). Such races put a
strain on resources of innovative ﬁrms and may diminish their
performance.
Therefore, although successful innovation often increases
performance of innovative ﬁrms directly, the same innovations
may decrease these ﬁrms’ relative performance indirectly by
intensifying product- and ﬁrm-level competition in the industry,
especially competition between innovation leaders. For example,
in the worldwide optical disk drive industry, ﬁrms with more
innovative products had greater survival chances, but the
proliferation of innovative products at the industry level increased
failure rates of all ﬁrms, including innovative companies (Khessina,
2006). Thus, while the direct effect of innovation is often positive,
its indirect effect through intensiﬁed competition is harmful and
can signiﬁcantly diminish direct beneﬁts.
Innovations dangerous to audiences and society
Under certain, not uncommon circumstances some product
innovations may harm ﬁrm employees, consumers, competing
organizations, governmental actors and other audiences. One key
audience, often negatively affected by innovative activities of
companies, but rarely discussed in this respect, is employees who
participate in the process of innovation development. Because the
process of innovating is often uncertain, but highly consequential,
employees who participate in it may experience strong emotions
(Elfenbein, 2007). Vuori and Huy (2016) suggest that hope and fear
as future-oriented emotions are very common during the processPlease cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
creativity and innovation, Research in Organizational Behavior (2018), hof innovation development. However, negative emotions tend to
override positive emotions in stressful situations because they
evolved to ensure survival (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, &
Vohs, 2001). Additionally, past-oriented negative emotions that
people may feel during the innovation development, such as,
shame or envy, can turn into fear. As a result, fear becomes a central
emotion in employees involved in developing innovations and may
negatively affect their well-being (Baumgartner, Pieters & Bagozzi,
2008; Vuori & Huy, 2016).
Consumers are another key audience often negatively affected
by innovation. As the literature on product-harm crises (deﬁned as
well-publicized occurrences wherein a product is found to be
dangerous for consumers) and product recalls shows, some
innovative products turn out to be unsafe to users and can harm
them (Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994; Wowak & Boone, 2015). For
example, Vioxx – an innovative drug for treating arthritis that was
recalled by Merck in 2004 – was linked to over 27,000 cases related
to heart attack and stroke accidents (Berenson, 2007).
A product-harm crisis may hurt not only consumers, but also
reduce ﬁrm performance. It may cause a drop in the ﬁrm’s stock
prices (Pruitt & Peterson, 1986) and damage both consumers’ and
the media’s favorable assessment of the brand (Klein & Dawar,
2004; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). A ﬁrm’s most
common response is to withdraw its dangerous product from the
market, either voluntarily (Siomkos, 1999) or under pressure from
national authorities (Mowen, Jolly, & Nickell, 1981). If a company
does not manage to recall its harmful product in a timely and
responsible manner, it will experience a blow to its reputation,
brand integrity, legitimacy and proﬁtability (Lai, Yang, & Wu, 2015).
Although a good faith recall of unsafe products is necessary for
legitimacy preservation, it may still have a large negative impact on
a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability because of disruptions in the production
process (Wowak & Boone, 2015) and legal charges. For example,
Merck agreed to pay $4.85 billion to settle lawsuits related to the
27,000 cases of injuries and death caused by Vioxx (Berenson,
2007). Thus, product innovations that turned out to be unsafe may
bring harm to consumers, and as a result, undermine a company’s
legitimacy, and both short-term and long-term ﬁnancial perfor-
mance and even survival (Magno, 2012).
Innovation may harm not only audiences, but can hinder future
innovations and scientiﬁc progress overall. In industries with
strong IP regimes, companies patent their inventions and
innovations. However, patents are a double-edged sword. On the
one hand, by providing IP protection, they increase ﬁrms’
incentives to innovate. On other hand, patents create monopoly
rents and raise barriers to knowledge access and diffusion, slowing
down future innovation (Encaoua et al., 2006). Indeed, an
increasing rate of patenting at U.S. universities is linked to a
slowing pace of knowledge exploitation in science-based technol-
ogy areas (Fabrizio, 2007). Thus, successful product innovation in
some organizations can hinder future innovations in others,
slowing down the overall industrial and even scientiﬁc progress at
the societal level.
To summarize, product innovations with low inherent costs
may still harm organizational performance and survival if they
generate signiﬁcant negative side effects, such as cannibalizing a
ﬁrm’s current products, intensifying competition in the industry,
as well as endangering and harming a ﬁrm’s audiences.
Long-term consequences of innovation
Innovation has not only short-term, but also long-term
consequences for ﬁrm performance and survival. We discuss
two major mechanisms behind negative long-term consequences
of innovation: (a) identity concerns and (b) traps of past innovation
success.er up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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Organizational identity is a set of codes that audiences, such as
employees, suppliers, investors, security analysts and consumers
use to classify an organization as a member of a speciﬁc market
category (Pólos, Hannan, & Carroll, 2002). For example, in the U.S.
brewing industry, lovers of specialty beer categorize ﬁrms as craft
breweries if they exhibit features of traditional methods, natural
ingredients, small volume production and local distribution; which
explicitly and consequentially distinguishes them from mass-
market brewers (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000). Firms possess
both internal identity (a set of codes shared by an organization’s
members) and external identity (a set of codes shared by external
audience members) (Hannan et al., 2007). Firms develop
organizational identities based on characteristics of speciﬁc
industries they participate in, as relevant audiences start
associating ﬁrms with their particular markets (Khessina & Carroll,
2008; McKendrick, Jaffee, Carroll, & Khessina, 2003). These
identities are often intertwined with a ﬁrm’s earlier technological
choices (Tripsas, 2009). Audiences form clear ideas about what
ﬁrms with a speciﬁc organizational identity do and penalize the
violation of their expectations by withdrawal of resources and
attention (Hsu & Hannan, 2005).
Some product innovations violate a producer’s identity and,
consequently, cause signiﬁcant penalties from audiences that
diminish and even remove altogether potential beneﬁts from
innovation. Speciﬁcally, when a ﬁrm creates a product innovation,
which is radically different from what it did in the past, relevant
audiences may see it as incongruent with the organizational
identity that they attached to this ﬁrm based on shared under-
standings about its previous industrial and technological activities.
Such identity-challenging innovations (Anthony & Tripsas, 2016;
Tripsas, 2009) violate expectations of audiences, and, as a result,
audiences penalize the ﬁrm by withdrawal of symbolic and
material resources (Kim & Jensen, 2011). For example, craft beer
producers that introduce innovative products in the American
lager category receive negative evaluations in product reviews
from consumers of specialty beer (Barlow, Verhaal, & Hoskins,
2016). This happens because consumers associate the American
lager category with mass producers and consider innovations in
this product space as violating the identity of a craft brewery
(Verhaal, Khessina, & Dobrev, 2015).
Even when audiences are not outright negative about identity-
challenging innovations, they may still ignore them, because they
often do not have tools to evaluate such innovations. For example,
in the photography industry and the wireline telecommunication
market, in their reports, security analysts ignored incumbent ﬁrms’
identity-challenging innovations, deﬁned as new products based
directly on a novel technology, because such innovations did not ﬁt
within traditional valuation models used by analysts in respective
market categories (Benner, 2010). Since the lack of attention from
security analysts leads to a discount in ﬁrms’ stock prices
(Zuckerman, 1999), the introduction of identity-challenging
innovations may have a substantial long-term negative inﬂuence
on the performance of ﬁrms in these markets (Benner, 2007).
When a ﬁrm participates only in one industry, it develops a
focused identity, as audiences unambiguously associate it with one
particular market (Khessina & Carroll, 2008; McKendrick et al.,
2003). Empirical research shows that audiences evaluate ﬁrms
with a focused identity more favorably (Hannan, 2010). Major
innovations may lead focused identity ﬁrms to innovate in new,
not-well-understood domains that blend different technological
categories (Lo & Kennedy, 2015). Innovating in such domains
dilutes a ﬁrm’s focused identity (Carnabuci, Operti, & Kovacs,
2015). This identity violation prompts relevant audiences to
penalize a (formerly) focused identity ﬁrm even if its resultingPlease cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
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example, Carroll, Feng, Le Mens, and McKendrick (2010) found that
in the tape drive data storage industry, producers introducing
product innovations associated with an unfocused organizational
identity exited the market at a higher rate. By contrast, ﬁrms that
innovated in areas associated with a focused identity survived
longer.
To summarize, organizational identity affects what innovative
actions of a ﬁrm are perceived as legitimate by relevant audiences.
Identity-challenging innovations, even when technologically
sound, may violate expectations of audiences and result in
symbolic and material penalties. Consequently, ﬁrm performance
and survival may suffer.
Traps of past innovation success
There is consistent evidence that ﬁrms that succeeded at
innovating in the past become less innovative in the future (e.g.,
Levinthal & March, 1993; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Wu, 2013). The
literature has identiﬁed two general types of interrelated mecha-
nisms that can explain this tendency: human and structural.
Human factors
The ﬁrst set of mechanisms relates to the nature of employee
cognition and socio-political behavior. Both managers and non-
managerial employees fall victims to the trap of past innovation
success. Driven by previous success in product innovation,
managers tend to stick to strategies proven to work in the past
(Audia et al., 2000; Miller & Chen, 1994). They do so, because they
prefer to repeat actions associated with positive outcomes (Levitt
& March, 1988), and because they consider it more efﬁcient to
exploit current competencies than to explore new knowledge and
possibilities (March, 1991). Although both exploitation and
exploration are essential for organizations, they compete for
scarce resources. Exploration is more uncertain and riskier than
exploitation. Managers are likely to take risks when they are still
searching for adequate solutions. Past success in innovating,
however, shifts their preferences from risky exploration with its
uncertain outcomes to more certain exploitation based on
experiential wisdom (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal &
March, 1993).
The balance between exploitation and exploration is the key to
sustained successful innovation (March, 1991). Even when
companies manage to pursue both exploitation and exploration,
they may still fail to combine them in a productive way. Companies
may continue to exploit old knowledge and at the same time
aggressively explore new and distant knowledge, but fail to
commercialize their new research and inventions because of
management’s cognitive inertia (Gavetti, 2005a; Tripsas & Gavetti,
2000).
Bounded rationality prompts managers to develop and rely on
mental models, which are simpliﬁed representations of the world
(Simon, 1955). Mental models are typically based on historical
experience and inﬂuence how managers frame problems and seek
solutions (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Senior managers who
experienced successful innovation in the past develop mental
models that impede their ability to depart from past innovations
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998). For example, senior managers at
Polaroid Corporation developed mental models based on the
company’s past success in innovating in instant (analog) photog-
raphy and failed to update these models when the new era of
digital photography arrived (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000).
Middle managers may also become victims of cognitive inertia
created by past innovation success. For example, Gavetti et al.
(2005) describe how Kodak failed at successfully switching from
the traditional ﬁlm photography to digital imaging despiteer up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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hired an outside CEO George Fisher who attempted to move Kodak
into the new digital era. Although Fisher hired a new top
management team with mental models similar to his, he failed
to recognize that the vast majority of middle managers was
ingrained with the old, previously very successful, mental model
and resisted and even sabotaged Fisher’s new digital strategy
(Gavetti, 2005b).
Non-managerial employees can also become a reason for the
trap of past innovation success. Previously successful inventors
may ﬁnd it more efﬁcient to focus their innovative efforts on the
exploitation of familiar knowledge that initially brought them
success. Reliance on familiar knowledge helps inventors generate
more ideas, more quickly (Levinthal & March, 1993). Additionally,
ideas based on familiar knowledge are less likely to encounter
resistance from managers and other employees (Tripsas & Gavetti,
2000). However, in their study of patenting activity, Audia and
Goncalo (2007) show that the increasing focus on exploitation of
past success makes inventors generate innovative ideas that are
increasingly incremental, and thus less likely to result in a
signiﬁcant innovation.
Socio-political behavior of employees is another important
factor for innovation success traps. Previous innovation success
tends to launch managers and inventors into positions of power in
an organization (Levinthal & March, 1993). For example, very
successful inventors acquire status of star scientists and, as a result,
get allocated greater tangible resources (Kehoe & Tzabbar, 2015).
Control over tacit knowledge underlying the past successful
innovations and tangible resources creates a power imbalance
between star scientists and their colleagues (Overbeck & Park,
2006), which star scientists are motivated to preserve (Pfeffer,
1981). Star scientists often prevent the diffusion of tacit knowledge
and sharing resources in order to promote their self-interests and
impede the rise of a new generation of innovation leaders (Kehoe &
Tzabbar, 2015). Given that inventors successful in the past tend to
become more incremental (Audia & Goncalo, 2007), the political
suppression of the emergence of new innovation leaders likely
leads to the reduction of successful innovative output in the ﬁrm.
Structural factors
The second set of mechanisms behind the traps of past
innovation success concerns organizational capabilities and
competencies, which refer to an organization’s ability to execute
routines and solve problems. They include a ﬁrm’s ability to
coordinate organizational structures of employment and produc-
tion, and the relationships with external actors (Carroll & Hannan,
2000; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Organizations develop and reﬁne
their capabilities in the process of learning as they age and acquire
experience (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Learning, however, is a
double-edged process that creates a number of traps: As producers
develop capabilities that improve their current performance, they
simultaneously close themselves off to innovation in new
knowledge areas (Levinthal & March, 1993).
Leonard-Barton (1992) explains how core capabilities, deﬁned
as a set of distinct technical systems, skills, and managerial systems
deeply rooted in values, may become core rigidities that impair a
ﬁrm’s ability to innovate in a new knowledge area. Core
capabilities develop as the result of an organization’s early success
and are effective for innovating in the technological regime of that
period. Because such core capabilities are entrenched in the old
value system, they prevent the development of capabilities in new
knowledge areas. The earlier in the organizational life cycle
innovation success occurs, the more detrimental its effect on a
ﬁrm’s future innovations. This happens because early innovation
success pushes a ﬁrm to focus on exploitation before it manages to
develop exploration capabilities (Rhee & Kim, 2015).Please cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
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innovation success. Driven by the mutual positive feedback between
experience and competence, organizations tend to engage in
activities at which they are competent and avoid those at which
they are not (Denrell & March, 2001). This self-reinforcing nature of
learning makes it attractive for organizations to become specialized
in areas in which their capabilities bring immediate advantage, and
reduce experimentation with other bases of knowledge (Levitt &
March, 1988). Thus, past innovation creates the competence trap. It
encourages the utilization of existing capabilities or complementary
assets (Teece, 1986), which in turn impedes future innovations in
new knowledge areas (McMillan & Overall, 2017).
Successful innovation reinforces the existing capabilities that
deal not only with internal processes, but also with the relation-
ships with external audiences. It prompts a ﬁrm to develop value
networks by creating marketing, distribution, and other capabili-
ties aimed at serving customers that became attracted to the ﬁrm
by its initial technological success (Christensen & Rosenbloom,
1995). However, when a new technology emerges, the ﬁrm’s well-
developed capabilities in serving existing customers may push it to
ignore the new technology preferred by new customers until it is
too late (Christensen & Bower, 1996). Empirical studies show that,
indeed, when a ﬁrm enjoys demand growth in its current market
that seems sufﬁciently high relative to alternative markets, it is
unlikely to move into a new market, even if it is capable (Wu, 2013).
Past innovation success may also push an organization into the
power trap (Levinthal & March, 1993). An innovative ﬁrm may
become a dominant player on the market capable of shaping its
environment through imposing its policies, products, and strate-
gies on others. However, the longer such an organization adapts by
changing its environment, the less it becomes capable of changing
itself (Barnett, 1997; Levinthal & March, 1993). When the
environment shifts dramatically, such a ﬁrm is likely to have
trouble innovating in order to adapt to the new order.
It is necessary to note that, although in speciﬁc situations either
human or structural factors may play a larger role in generating
traps of past innovation success, both factors signiﬁcantly matter
and interact in their impact. The cognition of employees shapes
organizational capabilities, while at the same time existing
capabilities mold employee cognition (Garud & Rappa, 1994;
Gavetti, 2005a).
To summarize, product innovations with low inherent costs and
minimal side effects may still harm organizational performance
and survival if they generate negative long-term consequences in
the form of identity penalties and traps of past innovation success.
General discussion
We began this article by drawing attention to the existing
orthodoxy that creativity and innovation are outcomes that are
seen as almost inherently positive. By reversing the equation to
consider creativity and innovation as independent rather than
dependent variables, our review uncovered a number of con-
sequences that are not necessarily positive and certainly more
complex than existing research would suggest. Both innovation
and creativity carry inherent costs, generate side effects, and are
subjects to tradeoffs between short-term and long-term con-
sequences. For example, being creative may feel liberating and
even mitigate psychological burdens, while at the same time
trigger impressions of volatile unpredictability and even license
employee theft. Similarly, an innovative outcome may bring proﬁt,
while at the same time disrupt critical organizational routines, the
loss of which may prove to be costly in the long run. Our
comprehensive review also suggests that creativity and innovation
are not separate processes unfolding in isolation from each other,
but rather the consequences of each are deeply intertwined.er up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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The process leading from creativity to innovation has the
potential to be highly path dependent as events that occur in the
early stages of creativity can have ripple effects that might impede
the subsequent development, implementation and commerciali-
zation of an idea. For example, the bias against creativity might
have negative downstream consequences. Innovations represent
only a narrow slice of the ideas that were initially available for
selection. If evaluators systematically avoid creative ideas, then
only a sub-optimal set of ideas will survive to be developed into
inventions and innovations. The end result might be the
commercialization of mundane products that will not necessarily
be appealing to customers. In other words, the bias against
creativity can also curtail innovation and lead to the generation of
innovations that fail to address market demands. Occasionally,
there are errors in the selection process and a highly creative idea
might survive the biases that are aligned against it. However,
resentful evaluators, thwarted in the creativity stage, might
attempt to sabotage the idea at the stage of invention, thus raising
the costs of testing and prototyping the idea and possibly causing
the ﬁrm to incorrectly reject the prototype as a failure.
Path dependence might also have negative consequences if
highly creative people, who might tend to be narcissistic and
egotistical, successfully convince evaluators to pursue their ideas
even if their ideas are not actually very good. The brashness and
unapologetic self-conﬁdence that creative people have in their
own ideas can make their pitches highly persuasive, even at the
expense of passing over objectively better ideas that are pitched by
individuals with less charisma. Pushing bad ideas through the
review process might eventually turn out to be costly and distract
attention from more promising ideas or from existing products.
Finally, because creative people are often ﬁltered out, it is
possible that decision makers with the most authority to green
light new ideas might be the least capable of recognizing a creative
idea when they see one. On the one hand, non-creative leaders
might produce innovations at a higher cost, because they are too
careful and do not look for non-standard solutions, but on the other
hand, they might produce innovation at a lower cost, because they
avoid risk. Future research should investigate the downstream
consequences of creative leadership for innovation to ascertain
whether the propensity of creative leaders to take risk will lead to
proﬁt or simply raise the costs incurred at the innovation stage. In
sum, the consequences of creativity, invention and innovation are
interconnected, as decisions and mistakes made in the earliest
stages of creativity can reverberate through the entire process and
eventually raise the cost of developing innovations.
Downstream costs of creative disinhibition for innovation
In evaluating the costs of innovation, one must consider the
costs that are incurred before an idea even reaches the stage of
invention. Engaging employees in the creative process can
disinhibit a host of anti-social behaviors that can indirectly harm
the organization and raise the cost of innovation. Dishonesty, theft,
overindulgence and raucous conﬂict all amplify both the direct
costs (e.g., stolen resources) and indirect costs (delays with
completing implementation) of the development of innovation,
and as a result, signiﬁcantly reduce potential beneﬁts from
innovations shipped to the market.
The costly side effects of creative disinhibition also raise the
incentive for organizations to steal ideas from each other and, as a
result, substantially decrease appropriability from innovation. From a
human resource perspective, it is far less costly to implement creative
ideas invented elsewhere, given the baggage that comes along with
recruiting, selecting and retaining creative people. Darker still is thePlease cite this article in press as: O.M. Khessina, et al., It’s time to sob
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produce innovations with a high risk of harming consumers and
other audiences. Indeed, the cognitive ﬂexibility that is required to
produce creative solutions can also lead to moral ﬂexibility, making
creative people particularly adept at justifying immoral new ideas.
The consequences of creative disinhibition are not inevitably
negative, however. The innovation process can be stressful to the
point of making employees more reliant on prescription medica-
tion, but, ironically, creative people might be more resilient to the
disruptive nature of innovation given their tolerance of ambiguity
and openness to new experience. Many other aspects of engaging
in the creative process can reduce stress, for example, being
creative can trigger positive emotions, help people relieve
psychological burdens, and build social bonds. All of these side
effects of being creative can help people cope with subsequent
stressors resulting from innovation.
Comparing creativity and innovation: parallel effects at multiple levels
of analysis
Our review uncovered some parallel effects of creativity and
innovation that might occur at different levels of analysis. For
example, both creativity and innovation can ramp up competition as
rising levels of each raise the standards fromwhich subsequent ideas
and innovations are judged. Such inﬂation of standards will raise the
cost of staying on the frontier of both creativity and innovation.
We also noted that both creativity and innovation can
potentially harm key audiences. Both creativity and innovation
can cause employees to feel stress as they deal with disrupted
routines, rising conﬂict, and resistance to change. Both creativity
and innovation can upend the status quo, leaving people to manage
high levels of uncertainty. Both creativity and innovation can give
rise to dangerous ideas and dangerous products that might bring
harm to consumers.
Creativity and innovation are also difﬁcult to maintain over
time, because they are subject to traps of past success. Past success
can stiﬂe creative thought and diminish innovation by prompting
people and organizations to focus on exploiting what they know at
the exclusion of exploring in new directions. In other words, both
creativity and innovation can precede long periods of stagnation.
Feedback loops: from innovation to creativity
Traps of past success may give rise to feedback loops, as
innovation can impact the creative process in several, potentially
contradictory ways. Innovation that achieves signiﬁcant commercial
success might, as we mentioned above, reduce creativity as the ﬁrm
switches from an exploration to exploitation mode of innovating.
But, if innovation turns out to be a commercial failure, two scenarios
arepossible. If theﬁrmhas enough resources, managementmaystart
encouraging creativity more than it did in the past, hoping to
eventually develop a commercially successful innovation. If the
ﬁrm’s resources were severely depleted by a failed attempt at
innovation, management may discourage creativity, as decision-
makers will need to focus on the challenge of renewing available
resources as the ﬁrm struggles for survival. Future research could
establish which scenario is more likely and under what conditions.
Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrated why, when evaluating beneﬁts
of either creativity or innovation, it is important to look not just at
their total beneﬁts, but at net beneﬁts after taking into consider-
ation all possible costs. It is eminently practical to fully consider all
of the potential costs that might be incurred before deciding to
pursue creativity and innovation in organizations. A moreer up: The direct costs, side effects and long-term consequences of
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organizations to anticipate and diffuse the inevitable byproducts
of creativity at work and the implementation of innovation.
We see many opportunities for advancing theory in manage-
ment and related disciplines based on the idea of creativity and
innovation being important and useful independent variables.
Indeed, our review has barely scratched the surface of the many
new questions that remain to be asked along the lines that we have
outlined here. Thus, we propose the alternative conceptualization
of creativity and innovation as independent variables as a new area
of inquiry that holds considerable promise.
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